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ABSTRACT
Do minimum wage increases serve as stepping-stones to higher-paying jobs for low-pay workers?
This paper analyzes the impact of state minimum wage policy on the one-year wage growth rates
of individuals across the wage distribution and whether that impact changes for individuals in
highly monopsonistic industries. I review the recent literature on the disemployment effect, the
impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates, the nature of monopsonistic industries, and
the relationship between the minimum wage and monopsony power. I offer theoretical reasons
why the minimum wage may impact the wage growth rates of individuals in monopsonistic
industries differently than it impacts those of individuals in competitive industries. I then reestimate Lopresti’s and Mumford’s (2016) panel fixed effects model to determine how the effect
of a minimum wage increase depends nonlinearly on the size of the increase. Using data from
2005-2008, Lopresti and Mumford found that small minimum wage increases have a significant
negative impact on wage growth rates, while large minimum wage increases have a significant
positive impact. Using data from 2016-2019, I find similar results. As my primary empirical
contribution, I test whether individuals in highly monopsonistic industries experience minimum
wage changes differently than individuals in more competitive industries. I find monopsony power
in the form of high labor immobility primarily impacts the wage growth rates of high-pay workers
and does not influence how low-pay workers experience minimum wage changes. Finally, I
recommend policymakers impose larger minimum wage increases to avoid impeding the wagegrowth of low-pay workers.
Key words: minimum wage, monopsony, wage growth, low-pay, focal point, job tenure.
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Section 1: Introduction
Working Americans have long suffered stagnant wages. Though the bottom 90 percent of
workers received modest gains to their real earnings when labor markets were at their tightest, the
vast majority of wage gains over the last 40 years have gone to the highest earners. According to
Congressional Research Service analysis, “[o]ver the 1979-2018 period, real wages at the 10th
percentile of the hourly wage distribution grew by 1.6 [percent], whereas wages at the 50th
percentile grew by 6.1 [percent] and wages at the 90th percentile grew by 37.6 [percent]”
(Gravelle, 2020). What is most shocking about this disparity is that it has accompanied a widening
of the gap between the growth of productivity and a typical worker’s pay. Between 1948 and 1973,
productivity increased by 96.7 percent and hourly compensation increased proportionally by 91.3
percent; however, between 1973 and 2013, productivity increased by 74.4 percent and hourly
compensation increased by a mere 9.2 percent (Mishel et al., 2015). Thus, workers have
experienced sticky wages even though productivity has steadily increased. Sticky wages are of
particular concern for minimum wage earners, whose wages fall far short of the living wage
(Nadeau, 2016). According to 538 Project Analysis, during the strong labor market of the mid1990s, only one in five minimum-wage workers sampled by the Census Bureau was still earning
the minimum wage a year after their first interview, but by 2016 that number was nearly one in
three (Cassleman, 2017). Though national wage growth has recently improved, it has not been for
the right reasons. The Economic Policy Institute notes average “wages grew [historically fast
between 2019 and 2020] largely because more than 80 [percent] of the 9.6 million net jobs lost in
2020 were jobs held by wage earners in the bottom 25 [percent] of the wage distribution” (Gould
and Kandra, 2021).
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Stagnant wages at entry-level positions hurt working families and the economy: they trap
families in poverty and deepen economic inequality by undermining career growth trajectories.
What can policymakers do to improve wage growth rates for low-pay workers?
Emerging literature suggests increasing the minimum wage may not only boost current
wages for low-pay workers, but also have a positive lasting impact on wage growth rates. Lopresti
and Mumford (2016) and Rinz and Voorheis (2018) found evidence that low-pay individuals
experiencing large minimum wage increases had faster wage growth than their counterparts not
experiencing minimum wage changes. These findings indicate that a higher minimum wage may
serve as a stepping-stone to higher-paying jobs for low-pay workers. Since the political debate is
otherwise at a standstill, this new evidence could alter the calculus of policymakers toward
favoring higher minimum wages. But much remains unknown regarding the relationship between
the minimum wage and wage growth rates. For policymakers to make informed decisions,
economists must conduct more research to determine how to optimally leverage minimum wage
policy to lift more people out of sticky low wages.
Thus far, researchers have shown the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates
depends on several factors. The first factor is the size of the “ripple effect.” Neumark et al. (2004)
found the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates—though most intense for individuals
nearest the minimum wage—ripples up to those higher in the wage distribution as well. The second
factor is the size of the minimum wage change. Lopresti and Mumford (2016) found small
increases to the minimum wage actually have a negative impact on wage growth rates of
individuals at or near the minimum wage; only large increases have a positive impact. Finally, the
effect the minimum wage has on wage growth rates may change over time. Rinz et al. (2018) found
minimum wage increases have a larger positive impact on five-year wage growth rates than they
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have on one-year wage growth rates. To the best of my knowledge, these are the primary sources
on the subject, and no research has been done to determine how industry type influences the impact
of the minimum wage level on wage growth rates. I contribute to the literature by replicating
Lopresti’s and Mumford’s model with 2016-2019 data, altering their model to capture the noncontemporaneous impact of the minimum wage, and testing whether the minimum wage impacts
the wage growth rates of individuals in monopsonistic industries differently.
This paper is divided into six sections. In Section 2, I review the recent literature on the
disemployment effect, the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates, the nature of
monopsonistic industries, and the relationship between the minimum wage and monopsony power.
I then explore the theoretical reasons why the minimum wage may impact the wage growth rates
of individuals in monopsonistic industries differently than it impacts those of individuals in
competitive industries. In Section 3, I describe my data sources and provide summary statistics for
the variables I use in my regression analysis. I also defend my assumption that increases in state
minimum wage levels are exogenous. In Section 4, I discuss my empirical strategy and estimate
several panel fixed effects models to isolate the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth
rates and how that impact changes for individuals working in highly monopsonistic industries. I
report the results of my regression analysis and conclude—like Lopresti and Mumford (2016)—
that small minimum wage increases may inhibit wage growth while large minimum wage increases
accelerate it. I find the impact of minimum wage policy on wage growth rates is not meaningfully
different for individuals in highly monopsonistic industries. In Section 5, I explore the theoretical
implications of my results. I ponder a potential tradeoff between sudden and gradual minimum
wage increases. Finally, I discuss why monopsony power in the form of high labor immobility
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might inhibit the wage growth of high-wage earners and not low-wage earners. In Section 6, I
conclude with a policy recommendation.
Section 2: Literature Review
There is a vast literature on minimum wage policy, its consequences, and its benefits. Some
evidence suggests higher minimum wages make it harder for low-skilled workers to find work and
result in greater unemployment, higher inflation rates, more business closures, faster high school
dropout rates, and accelerated automation (Clemens, 2021; Congressional Budget Office, 2014;
Aaronson, 2013; Dugan, 2013; Perry, 2014; DePillis, 2015). Other research shows higher
minimum wages increase economic activity and job growth, reduce poverty, lower government
safety-net spending, decrease economic inequality, improve public health outcomes, lower crime
rates, and allow more people to earn a living wage (Cooper, 2013; Congressional Budget Office,
2014; Cooper, 2014; Autor, 2015; Bhatia, 2014; Fernandez, 2013; Fredericksen, 2015). I focus my
analysis of the literature on recent works that are relevant to the impact of the minimum wage on
wage growth rates. To contextualize the influence of the minimum wage on labor market
dynamics, I examine the literature on the disemployment effect. I then review three papers that
model the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates. Finally, I discuss the literature on
monopsonistic industries and the relationship between monopsony and the minimum wage. I
present my analysis of how the minimum wage might impact the wage growth rates of individuals
working in monopsonistic industries differently from those working in competitive industries as a
theoretical contribution to the literature.

Section 2.1: The Disemployment Effect
Theoretically, the minimum wage has two direct impacts on the economy (see Figure 1
below). All other things equal, an increase in the minimum wage results in higher earnings for
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those whose jobs initially paid between the old and new minimum wage. However, it also
decreases the quantity of low-wage labor hours demanded by firms while increasing the supply of
labor hours workers want to provide at the new higher minimum wage. The resulting change in
the unemployment level is the sum of the decrease in labor demand and the increase in the number
of people seeking work (represented as the grey line from Figure 1). Most empirical analyses of
the minimum wage tend to focus on the “disemployment effect:” the simple change in employment
caused by a minimum wage change (represented as Ee – Emin in Figure 1). I define the
“disemployment effect” not as the decrease in the number of people employed as result of a
minimum wage change, but as the decrease in the total number of hours worked by the impacted
individuals. For a minimum wage hike to increase the relative earnings of the low-pay workers,
the earnings the impacted individuals gain from their higher wages must be greater than the
earnings they lose from the disemployment effect. If there is too great a disemployment effect,
increasing the minimum wage would more closely resemble “income redistribution among lowincome families than income redistribution from high to low-income families,” and therefore
would not decrease economic inequality by any common metric (Neumark, 2004, p.315).
According to Reich et al. (2017), the first economist to use the labor supply and demand
model (Figure 1) to argue against increasing the minimum wage was George Stigler in his 1946
essay “The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation.” Without empirical evidence, he
conjectured increasing the minimum wage would cause “direct and substantial” disemployment
(Stigler, 1946, p.361). Theoretically, the true size of the disemployment effect depends on both
the magnitude of the minimum wage increase and the elasticity of labor demand. The elasticity of
labor demand depends both on the slope of the demand curve and the starting point on the curve,
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which is determined by the initial minimum wage level. Thus, an important question is: how
inelastic is firm demand for minimum wage workers?1
Figure 1: The Wage and Employment Effects of a Minimum Wage Increase

Since Stigler’s time, the debate between economists on the employment effects of
minimum wage policy has shifted from a theoretical one to an evidence-based one as better data
and data tools have become available. However, economists still cannot agree on the size (and
even the existence) of the disemployment effect. Some economists observed a significant
disemployment effect (Brown, 1988; Jardim et al., 2017; Brummund and Strain, 2020); others
observed no significant effect or even a significant positive employment effect (Card and Krueger,
1993; Reich et al., 2017; Allegretto et al., 2018). Wolfson and Belman (2017) conducted a metaanalysis of 37 studies published between 2000 and 2016 and concluded the consensus range for
the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage is -0.12 to -0.05, which suggests
the magnitude of the wage gains received because of a minimum wage increase is typically larger
than the magnitude of the wage losses incurred because of the disemployment effect (Wolfson and

1

The elasticity of labor supply is also important, although most estimates find it highly inelastic for prime-age
workers.
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Belman, 2017). They found evidence that publication bias may have influenced their results but
adjusting for it did not enough to alter their conclusion that the disemployment effect is small.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume minimum wage increases tend to increase the total wage bill of
low-pay workers.

Section 2.2: Why Study Wage Growth Rates
Historically, economists and policymakers have understood minimum wage policy as a
tradeoff between a lower unemployment level and higher earnings at the bottom end of the income
distribution. Minimum wage increases are typically depicted with static models like Figure 1. But
what if minimum wage increases change labor demand and labor supply over time? What if
minimum wage increases do not simply cause a one-time increase in wages, but a lasting impact
on wage growth rates? According to Rinz and Voorheis:
Previous cross-sectional work has found that increasing the minimum wage raises family
incomes at the bottom of the distribution, but if minimum wages also change labor market
dynamics, individuals who have higher earnings at a point in time due to an increase in the
minimum wage may see those gains reversed, or intensified, over time. (Rinz and Voorheis,
2018, p.20)
If increasing the minimum wage also increases wage growth rates, then higher minimum wages
will be more desirable. In addition to reducing poverty and economic inequality, a higher minimum
wage could serve as a stepping-stone to launch low-pay workers into higher-paying jobs.
Alternatively, if increasing the minimum wage decreases wage growth rates, then higher minimum
wages, even if they have a short-run benefit, could become poverty traps in the long run. Thus, the
effect of the minimum wage level on wage growth outcomes has important implications for the
evaluation of minimum wage policy. To explore this effect, economists such as Neumark et al.
(2004), Lopresti and Mumford (2016), and Rinz and Voorheis (2018) have used panel data to
examine the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates.
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Neumark et al. (2004) analyze how changes to the minimum wage impact wage growth
rates throughout the wage distribution. Lopresti and Mumford (2016) and Rinz and Voorheis
(2018) build on Neumark et al. (2004) and identify theoretical mechanisms for how the minimum
wage impacts wage growth rates. Lopresti and Mumford (2016) investigate focal point theory: the
idea that if the minimum wage is increased more slowly than the lower bound wage would have
increased in the free market, then minimum wage workers may experience slower wage growth
because employers will tacitly collude in scheduling raises for low-wage workers based on the rate
of increase of the minimum wage. Additionally, Rinz and Voorheis (2018) theorize that higher
minimum wage levels increase workers' attachment to firms, which allows workers more
opportunities to move up the job ladder within their firms and achieve higher earnings. I discuss
the methodologies and findings of each paper below.

Section 2.2.1: Neumark et al. (2004) and The Ripple Effect
To my knowledge, Neumark et al. (2004) were the first to study the impact of the minimum
wage on wage growth rates. They argue that employer behavior is sensitive to minimum wage
policy and suggest minimum wage changes may impact wage growth outcomes for workers
throughout the wage distribution. For example, they note that employers may alter work hours or
wages in response to a minimum wage change, or they may alter the mix of workers throughout
the pay scale to realign the marginal product of their workers with the wages they are paid.
Neumark et al. (2004) theorize that minimum wage changes will impact wage growth rates
throughout the wage distribution, albeit workers with higher earnings to a lesser extent.
To test their hypothesis, they use Current Population Survey (CPS) outgoing rotation
groups data from 1979 to 1997 and a panel fixed effects model with state, year, and month fixed
effects to test whose earnings change when the minimum wage is exogenously increased, and what
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is the size and direction of that change. They include both a contemporaneous measure and a oneyear lag of the change in the minimum wage variable. Their findings indicate that the minimum
wage impacts individuals with wages as high as twice the minimum wage.2
More novel is Neumark et al.’s finding on the effects of a minimum wage increase over
time. They find that workers whose earnings are within twice the minimum wage initially
experience wage gains, but their hours and employment decline enough in the following year that
the minimum wage has a net negative effect on earned income. Thus, they find that—despite the
initial positive ripple effect—the minimum wage has an adverse effect on wage growth rates in
the medium-run (and, by extrapolation, the long-run). Thus, according to Neumark et al. (2004),
increasing the minimum wage actually hurts low-pay workers and makes it harder for them to earn
higher wages.
Though Neumark et al.’s analysis is dated, they set two important precedents for future
studies analyzing the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates: models should show
how workers throughout the wage distribution are impacted by minimum wage changes, and
models should include lagged changes to the minimum wage variable because the impact may
persist or change over time. The framework of Neumark et al. (2004) served as the basis for a
paper by Lopresti and Mumford (2016), who altered the former’s analysis and found very different
results (see below).

2

Neumark et al.’s finding—that minimum wage increases at least initially benefit those with earnings above the
minimum wage—is far from novel. First formalized by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), economists call the
phenomenon the “ripple effect.” Minimum wage hikes are thought to result in wage increases or ripple effects for
workers further up the wage ladder because employers want to maintain progression in their pay scales (Wicks-Lim,
2018). The theory is supported by empirical evidence: minimum wage spillover or ripple effects have been shown to
occur for workers earning up to 15 percent above newly implemented minimum wages (Dube, Giuliano, and
Leonard, 2015).
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Section 2.2.2: Lopresti and Mumford (2016) and Focal Point Theory
The recent trend of more states setting minimum wage levels substantially higher than the
federal level has given contemporary research much more variation over time and place to analyze.
Lopresti and Mumford (2016) use this variation in their estimation of the effect of minimum wage
changes on wage growth rates using data from August 2005 to June 2008. They propose focal
point theory as the driving mechanism of the effect. According to focal point theory, employers
collectively schedule raises for workers at the bottom of the income distribution based on the rate
of increase of the minimum wage level. Thus, if the minimum wage increases more slowly than
the lower bound wage would have in the free market, then low-pay workers may experience slower
wage growth rates. The basis for this argument is a game theory model proposed by Shelkova
(2008) in which low-wage employers tacitly collude in setting wages. In the game, employers do
not individually bargain with workers to set wages; rather, all employers collectively set one
unnaturally low wage, effectively acting as monopsonists, and wait until workers are forced to fill
vacancies because they need an income and there are no alternative options. As the game is
repeated over time, “the equilibrium wage can be anywhere between the wage that a monopsonist
would set and the marginal product of labor (the competitive equilibrium)” (Lopresti and
Mumford, 2016, p.1183). Notably, the outcome of this game is optimal for employers—the only
reason it does not (openly) happen in reality is that collusion is illegal. Lopresti and Mumford
(2016) propose that small minimum wage increases may serve as focal points for low-wage
employers, making it possible for them to sustain coordination without explicit collusion. That is,
low-wage employers can restrict wage growth rates for those at or near the minimum wage to
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parallel the unnaturally slow wage growth caused by small, delayed increases in the legislated
minimum wage.3
Lopresti and Mumford (2016) find the predictions of focal point theory consistent with
their empirical findings. Like Neumark et al. (2004), they compare single year wage growth
outcomes between individuals living in states that increased the minimum wage with those of
individuals living in states that did not. Lopresti and Mumford (2016) use CPS outgoing rotation
group data and a similar approach to Neumark et al. (2004); however, they adapt Neumark et al.’s
panel fixed effects model to allow the effect of a given minimum wage increase to vary depending
on the relative size of the increase. More specifically, they differentiate between 0-5 percent
minimum wage increases, 5-10 percent increases, 10-20 percent increases, and 20 percent or
greater increases. They conclude:
[w]ithin the first quartile of the wage distribution, individuals experiencing minimum wage
increases of less than 5% have lower wage growth than similar individuals who experience
no change in the minimum wage law, with the magnitude of the estimated effect ranging
from 25.6 to 221.9% [sic]. Moderate minimum wage changes of 5 to 20% lead to small,
often statistically insignificant wage effects. It is only for minimum wage increases in
excess of 20% that we observe strong positive wage effects of a minimum wage increase,
with these effects concentrated among workers with an initial wage no more than 10%
above the minimum wage. (Lopresti and Mumford, 2016, p.1181)
These results are consistent with what one would expect if employers used small minimum wage
increases as a focal point for tacit collusion. However, Lopresti’s and Mumford’s model did not
capture the lagged effects of changes to the minimum wage. They also chose to omit from their
analysis individuals who dropped out of the labor market between survey interviews and therefore
do not capture the disemployment effect as Neumark et al. (2004) did. But their results offer
suggestive evidence of focal point theory, warranting further investigation into the matter.

3

If this illicit collusion occurs unnoticed, then it will make minimum wage policy appear less effective than it
otherwise would be, thereby arming legislators opposed to minimum wage increases with deceptive evidence to
support their potentially ill-founded grievances.
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Focal point theory only explains how the minimum wage level impacts wage growth when
the minimum wage is increased more slowly than we would expect wages in the competitive
market to grow on their own. It does not explain why wage growth increased for workers at or near
the minimum wage when the minimum wage was increased more substantially. For that
explanation, we turn to Rinz and Voorheis (2018).

Section 2.2.3: Rinz and Voorheis (2018) and Increased Attachment to Firm
Rinz and Voorheis (2018) argue that higher minimum wages may cause low-pay workers
to experience faster wage growth by increasing worker attachment to firms. Economists have
developed two models to explain why raising the minimum wage may increase job tenure. Dube
et al. (2016) use their “job ladder model” to describe how minimum wage increases may decrease
the frequency of employment to employment (EE) (i.e., job to job) transitions. They argue that,
when the minimum wage is increased, the wage distribution is compressed, and low-wage earners
may consequently receive fewer better-paying job offers. For example, suppose the minimum
wage is increased from $7.25 to $9.00. All the firms that might initially have offered a particular
minimum wage worker an intermediate wage (of, say, $8.00 per hour) may not find it profitable
to offer even the new minimum wage. Since the worker will receive fewer better offers capable of
inducing an employment transition, they are expected to stay at their original job for a longer
period.
Alternatively, Brochu and Green (2013) offer the “match quality learning model” to
illustrate their theory that increasing the minimum wage impacts the frequency of employment-tounemployment (EU) transitions. First, a minimum wage increase may reduce job tenure because
fewer matches are deemed profitable, so firms may be more likely to lay off workers. However,
the overall impact is not that simple. In general, when a firm hires a minimum wage worker, it
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gains information over time as to whether that worker was a good hire. In the event of a minimum
wage increase, the initial "sunk cost" from choosing incorrectly becomes more severe, so firms
may have fewer layoffs because they are more likely to stick with their current workers. Thus, the
overall impact of a minimum wage increase on the EU flow is ambiguous—an empirical question.
To answer this empirical question, Dube et al. (2016) used Quarterly Workforce Indicators
(QWI) data from 2000 to 2011 and created an empirical model that capitalizes on minimum wage
policy discontinuities at state borders. They find that increasing the minimum wage reduces
turnover, especially among low-tenure workers. At the time of the study, the QWI did not
disaggregate separations to other jobs from separations to nonemployment, so they were unable to
determine through which avenue (i.e., whether it was EE transitions, EU transitions, or both)
increasing the minimum wage decreased job turnover. In either case, the reduction in turnover can
explain why large increases to the minimum wage improve wage growth rates. As Rinz and
Voorheis note, “[i]f a higher minimum wage keeps a worker attached to employment, opportunities
to move up the job ladder within her firm could lead the long-run change in earnings to exceed
that observed in the short run” (Rinz and Voorheis, 2018, p.3). That is, if higher minimum wages
cause workers to stay with their firms, then workers may earn more promotions and commensurate
higher wages than they would have if instead they bounced around from one minimum wage job
to the next.4 Firms are more likely to promote workers who stay for a longer period because they
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As will be discussed in Section 2.3, if workers become stuck in their jobs or have few alternative employment
options, then their employers have price-setting power and can stifle their wage growth. Employers have pricesetting power in these cases because the mechanisms causing attachment to firm are the inelastic preferences of
workers. Alternatively, the “job ladder model” and “match quality learning model” both illustrate instances when
employers have an incentive to keep their current workers. Since it is the preferences of the employers causing
increased attachment to firm in these cases, they do not enjoy price-setting power to constrain wage growth. Indeed,
for reasons stated above, worker’s wage may grow more quickly when the preferences of their employers cause
workers to stay with their firms.
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know relatively more about those workers and because those workers tend to become more
productive after developing relevant skills by staying in the same job or industry.
According to Rinz and Voorheis’s empirical analysis, the theory plays out as expected:
increasing the minimum wage improves wage growth rates. Using earnings data from the Social
Security Administration (SSA), they estimate growth incidence curves, which capture the income
growth rates caused by the minimum wage at each percentile of the initial income distribution
between two given years. They find that a persistent 10 percent increase in the minimum wage
would increase the earnings growth of low-pay workers by about seven to eight percentage points
over five years compared to those not experiencing a minimum wage change. Contrary to the
conclusion of Neumark et al. (2004), Rinz and Voorheis find that the lagged impact of the
minimum wage on wage growth is persistently positive. The analysis of Rinz and Voorheis (2018)
is both recent and relies on administrative data, which is less prone to measurement error. The
magnitude of the impact declines to approximately zero by the 15th to 30th percentile of the
income distribution, depending on the specification (this finding is consistent with previous work
on the ripple effect discussed in Section 2.2.1). They also find that the minimum wage has a
stronger effect on five-year wage growth rates than it does on one-year wage growth rates, which
suggests that effects of the minimum wage on the bottom of the earnings distribution may grow in
magnitude over time. This finding is consistent with what one would expect if increased
attachment to firms was the driving mechanism by which the minimum wage increased wage
growth rates, as it would likely take time to reap the benefits of promotions granted for increased
experience and tenure.
The results of Lopresti and Mumford (2016) and Rinz and Voorheis (2018) are consistent
that large increases to the minimum wage positively impact wage growth rates throughout the
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lower percentiles of the income distribution; however, Rinz and Voorheis do not distinguish
between minimum wage increases of different magnitudes as Lopresti and Mumford (2016) do.
Therefore, their model is incapable of detecting the focal point effect of small minimum wage
increases. If focal point theory holds true and small increases in the minimum wage do decrease
wage growth rates, then Rinz and Voorheis’s results overstate the impact of small minimum wage
increases and understate the impact of large minimum wage increases. Future studies should
differentiate between the impact of large and small minimum wage increases to avoid this potential
bias.
To summarize, prior research on the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates
has suggested four things. First, changes to the minimum wage impact earners up to the 15th to
30th percentile of the income distribution via the ripple effect. Second, small increases to the
minimum wage may decrease wage growth rates, whereas large increases may increase wage
growth rates. Third, a minimum wage increase has a non-contemporaneous impact on wage growth
rates. Fourth, the minimum wage may have a stronger impact on medium-run wage growth rates
than short-run wage growth rates. One question that remains unexplored is whether monopsony
power influences the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates.

Section 2.3: Monopsonistic Industries
Previous minimum wage literature has analyzed the impact of monopsony power because
minimum wage increases may result in positive employment effects for workers in monopsonistic
industries (Azar et al., 2019). In this section, I develop arguments for why we might expect
minimum wage increases to impact wage growth outcomes for workers in monopsonistic
industries differently than workers in competitive industries.
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As previewed above, a monopsony is a market structure in which a single buyer controls
the labor market as the only buyer of labor. Figure 2 below depicts a monopsonist’s incentive to
offer a wage below the competitive market wage. Theoretically, firms are obligated to pay workers
roughly the same wage for the same work (gender and race wage gaps are a notable departure from
this), which makes it increasingly costly for a firm to take on workers who require higher wages:
the firm not only has to pay more for each incremental worker asking for higher pay but has to
offer all their other workers the wage they paid their most costly worker. The marginal cost curve
(also called the marginal efficiency of investment), therefore, has a steeper slope than the labor
supply curve (twice as steep if it is linear). The typical market equilibrium wage WC would lie
where the labor demand curve intersects with the supply curve. Instead, monopsonists offer the
wage W0, which attracts the number of workers determined by the intersection between their
marginal expense and demand curves. Though this lower wage favors the monopsonist, workers
have no choice but to accept the lower wage because there is, by definition, no alternative
employment option.
Now consider the effect of imposing a minimum wage on a monopsony. If a government
authority forces the monopsonist to offer a minimum wage W1, the new supply curve can be
thought of as a horizontal line at the new minimum wage level that kinks and becomes the old
supply curve when the two intersect. Since each additional worker does not cost more than the
previous worker when the firm must offer the minimum wage, the new marginal cost curve
(depicted as the orange lines in Figure 2) also becomes the horizontal line at the new minimum
wage level until that horizontal line intersects with the old supply curve, at which point the
marginal cost curve returns to its original higher level. As a result, the firm will hire the number
of workers where the new marginal cost curve meets the labor demand curve (i.e., the number of
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workers the firm demands at W1). Thus, E1-E0 more workers are hired at a higher wage, and the
firm loses some of its initial profit surplus. As shown in Figure 2, the overall employment effect
depends on the size of the minimum wage increase. Increasing the minimum wage too substantially
can cause a disemployment effect even when the employer is a monopsonist. Policymakers are
thus faced with a delicate calculus, one that is impossible without empirical analyses that precisely
detail how monopsonists respond to minimum wage increases.
Figure 2:

W1

WC
W1

WC

W0

W0

Demand

Demand

Source: Congressional Budget Office.5
Notably, “[t]raditional monopsony is clearly unrealistic… since employers obviously
compete with one another to some extent. But there are a range of choices between perfect
competition and monopsony where a degree of market power coexists with competition between
employers” (Bhaskar et al., 2002, p.156). Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office delineates
several real labor-market conditions that could provide firms with monopsony or “price-setting”
power:
Monopsony power… can arise from several sources. In some localities, there is only one
employer of workers in certain occupations, and therefore such workers would have to
5

I made minor changes to Figure 2 to facilitate my discussion of it.
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commute longer distances or move to get a higher wage. Even workers who live near
multiple potential employers may face substantial costs from changing jobs, such as having
to leave coworkers they like or having to put in the time and effort required to search for a
new job. Other potential sources of monopsony power include employers that collude to
keep wages low or require employees to sign “noncompete” agreements, which limit
workers’ ability to change employers. Monopsony power can also arise when state or local
governments require workers in particular occupations to obtain certifications. Workers in
such occupations who want a job in a different locale may have to obtain new certifications.
(Alsalam, 2019)
To quantify monopsony on a relative scale, Corella (2020) defines a system for measuring how
“monopsonistic” an industry is based on the mobility of workers out of the industry. Workers in
industries with low labor mobility have fewer alternative employment opportunities; thus, Corella
(2020) argues firms in these industries have more monopsony power to set wages (Corella, p.12,
2020). The mobility of workers across industries can be estimated at the industry level with
publicly available CPS data.
Henceforth, when I refer to monopsonistic industries, I am referring to industries with high
degrees of labor immobility unless otherwise specified.

Section 2.4: Do Monopsonistic Industries Respond Differently to Minimum Wage Increases?
I present two theoretical arguments for why minimum wage increases might impact the
wage growth rates of workers in monopsonistic industries differently than they impact those of
workers in competitive industries. I assume that focal point theory (see Section 2.2.2) and
increased attachment to firm (see Section 2.2.3) are the mechanisms by which the minimum wage
influences wage growth rates to ground my hypotheses.
If we assume Lopresti and Mumford (2016) are correct that small increases to the minimum
wage decrease wage growth rates because employers treat the minimum wage as a focal point,
how might the impact of small increases to the minimum wage be different for workers in
monopsonistic industries? Notably, focal point theory would not apply in the traditional
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monopsony case because there can be no collusion if there is only one employer. However, the
application of focal point theory is ambiguous for workers in monopsonistic industries. Since firms
in monopsonistic industries have price-setting power, workers’ wages in monopsonistic industries
are already unnaturally constrained. Firms in monopsonistic industries employing minimum wage
workers are less likely to increase wages above the minimum wage since workers are stuck in their
industry and have fewer alternative employment options. Thus, focal point theory may not apply
to monopsonistic industries since the lower bound wage may not increase in the free market.
Accordingly, I hypothesize that small increases to the minimum wage will have a relatively
positive effect on workers in monopsonistic industries compared to those in competitive industries.
In addition, if we assume Rinz and Voorheis are correct that large increases to the minimum
wage increase wage growth rates because workers become more attached to their firms, how might
the impact of large increases to the minimum wage be different for workers in monopsonistic
industries? There are two reasons workers in monopsonistic industries are unlikely to benefit from
increased attachment to firm. First, workers in monopsonistic industries are already likely to be
highly attached to their jobs because they have fewer alternative employment options. Specifically,
they have restricted access to jobs in other industries. Since workers in monopsonistic industries
are already less likely to leave their firms, the “job ladder model” and “match quality learning
model” effects will be smaller than they would be for workers in competitive industries.
Alternatively, even if increasing the minimum wage does cause workers in monopsonistic
industries to be less likely to change jobs, they will receive fewer gains from increased attachment
to firm than workers in competitive industries. When workers in competitive industries become
attached to their employers, they develop skills and experience that make them more valuable to
their employers over time. Since workers in monopsonistic industries tend to transition to jobs
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within their same industry, their skills and experience are already typically applicable at their new
jobs. Unlike workers in competitive industries, they will not climb the job ladder more easily than
before the minimum wage increase made them more attached to their firms. Accordingly, I
hypothesize that large increases to the minimum wage will have a relatively negative impact on
the wage growth rates of workers in monopsonistic industries compared to those in competitive
industries.
I test these hypotheses about the effects of differently sized minimum wage increases on
wage growth rates differ for individuals in highly monopsonistic industries using publicly
available CPS outgoing rotation group data. If workers in monopsonistic industries experience
statistically different effects from minimum wage increases, decision makers should take those
different effects into account when devising minimum wage policy. This paper will supplement
those reviewed above to help policymakers make informed decisions that better serve society.

Section 2.5: Summary of Literature Review
Though previous studies have focused on the contemporaneous impact of the minimum
wage, emerging literature suggests the minimum wage has an important impact on one and even
five-year wage growth rates. Neumark et al. (2004) showed that the impact of the minimum wage
on wage growth rates ripples up to earners higher in the income distribution, a result that has been
replicated by Lopresti and Mumford (2016) and Rinz and Voorheis. The consensus range for the
ripple effect is between roughly the 15th and 30th percentile of the income distribution. Lopresti
and Mumford (2016) offer focal point theory as an explanation for why small increases to the
minimum wage may decrease wage growth rates. Using empirical evidence, they defend the
hypothesis that low-wage employers tacitly collude in pegging wages to minimum wages. Rinz
and Voorheis argue that increased attachment to firms is another possible mechanism for why
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relatively large increases to the minimum wage improve wage growth rates. They theorized that
large increases to the minimum wage improved one- and five-year wage growth rates because
employees stuck with their employers and, as a result, ultimately earned promotions by climbing
up the job ladders within their firms. Finally, because they have fewer alternative employment
options and limited wage growth, I hypothesize that individuals in monopsonistic industries will
not experience the “job ladder model” and “match quality learning model” or focal point effects
of minimum wage changes. Thus, I expect small minimum wage increases will have a relatively
positive effect on the wage growth rates of workers in monopsonistic industries compared to those
in competitive industries, whereas large minimum wage increases will have a relatively negative
effect.
Section 3: Data
In this section, I discuss my data sources and sample restrictions and argue that minimum
wage changes are exogenous.

Section 3.1: Data Sources
I use publicly available Current Population Survey (CPS) outgoing rotation group data
cleaned by the Economic Policy Institute. I limit my analysis to 2016-2019 because it is the most
recent, pre-pandemic three-year period. Households in the CPS are interviewed for four months,
not interviewed for eight months, and then interviewed again for four more months. The survey
collects a variety of information from respondents, including demographic information, education
levels, job tenure, occupation type, and industry type. Individuals who are interviewed for the
fourth month and again one year later (on their eighth-month interview) are asked additional labor
questions regarding their periodicity of pay, hourly wage, usual weeks worked per year, usual
hours worked a week, and overtime pay. The universe of these questions, in addition to being
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month-in-sample four or eight, includes only civilians age 15 and older who are employed as a
wage or salaried worker (not self-employed) at the fourth-month interview.
Additionally, I use Vaghul and Zipperer’s (2019) minimum wage data set to recover
monthly minimum wages at the state level. I use the average level of the monthly state minimum
wage level for all my estimations. That is, if a state increased its minimum wage from $10.00 to
$11.00 three-fourths of the way through a given month, the minimum wage level would be
recorded as $10.25 for that month. I use this measure to reduce the noise introduced by variance
in the timing of interviews throughout a given month. The state measure of the minimum wage
does not capture the impact of changes to the minimum wage at the county or city level, which
will make the estimates below less precise.
To create controls for state-level economic conditions, I use state price level and state real
gross domestic product (RGDP) data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; I use state poverty
rate data compiled by the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research; and I use statelevel percent union membership and monthly state unemployment rate data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. I also calculate the percentage of workers in each state who report earning a wage
below the federal minimum wage using the CPS.

Section 3.2: Restricting the Sample
CPS outgoing rotation group data is not a true panel data set because individuals who
change addresses between interviews are not followed. Because of both the mobility of
respondents between interview years and reporting error, I cannot match everyone interviewed in
the fourth interview month to a corresponding interview one year later. The imperfect match rate
could bias my results if there is a systematic relationship between attrition and wage growth or the
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size of changes to the minimum wage. To account for this issue, I weighted the reduced sample
based on the initial characteristics of the original sample to control for attrition bias. 6
To ensure my results are comparable with those of Lopresti and Mumford (2016), I include
the same sample restrictions imposed in their analysis to focus on workers in sectors affected by
the minimum wage. The following individuals have been removed: those earning a wage more
than $0.10 below the minimum wage, those earning an hourly wage greater than or equal to $120,
those experiencing a wage change greater than 1,000 percent, those listed as self-employed or
agricultural workers, and individuals younger than 16.

Section 3.3: Are Changes to the Minimum Wage Exogenous?
One concern economists in this field continue to grapple with is whether increases to the
minimum wage are exogenous. Lopresti and Mumford (2016) argue “there is a great deal of
randomness inherent in the political process, and this may be the main source of variation in the
timing of increases to the minimum wage” (Lopresti, 2016, p.1174). Dube (2019) challenges this
notion, asserting that “states with higher minimum wages may systematically differ with respect
to other attributes (such as unemployment insurance generosity) that may affect how a given
change in the state unemployment rate translates into changes in family incomes or the incidence
of poverty” (Dube, 2019, p.275). Lopresti and Mumford (2016) do not control for government
transfer payments. Since I want my results to be comparable to theirs, I do not control for
government transfer payments either. However, we do include several variables to account for
state-level economic conditions, including the state poverty rate, the percentage of workers earning
a wage that is below the federal minimum wage, the percentage of workers in the state who belong
to a union, the growth rate in state per capita GDP in the year prior to the individuals’ first

6

I used a sample weight variable included in the CPS.
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interview, the state price level, and the monthly state unemployment rate, as well as month, year,
and state fixed effects. Like Lopresti and Mumford (2016), I check for systematic differences in
the characteristics of state-year observations across the different groups defined by the size of the
minimum wage increase (see Table 1). Each characteristic reflects information reported by the
applicable respondents before the minimum wage increase. All dollar values are nominal.
Individuals living in states that increased the minimum wage tended to report higher wages and
family incomes; however, most of these differences are likely accounted for by variance in price
level across states. Otherwise, I failed to identify any clear systematic differences between the
groups. Since states with different minimum wage policies are similar in observed characteristics,
I assume that they are similar in unobserved characteristics (including government transfers) as
well. Therefore, I assume minimum wage changes are exogenous.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Minimum Wage Change
Variable

Full Sample

No Change

0-5%

5-10%

10-20%

>20%

Observations

151,127

82,727

39,909

24,699

3,118

674

Mean Wage (OTC)

26.50

25.07

27.05

29.52

28.72

25.76

Percentage Employed

100

100

100

100

100

100

Female

48.27%

49.37%

49.96%

48.59%

48.99%

46.70%

Male

51.73%

50.63%

50.04%

51.41%

51.01%

53.30%

White Only

65.31%

67.80%

63.66%

62.26%

71.50%

57.79%

Black Only

10.63%

12.61%

8.03%

10.05%

5.66%

3.94%

Hispanic

15.80%

13.36%

18.74%

17.73%

13.80%

30.02%

Less than high school

6.61%

7.29%

6.09%

5.73%

4.69%

7.55%

High school only

25.47%

26.67%

25.18%

22.75%

23.63%

22.82%

Some College

28.37%

28.70%

29.30%

25.56%

29.84%

30.89%

College

24.92%

23.84%

25.45%

27.16%

25.12%

25.13%

Advanced

14.63%

13.51%

13.97%

18.80%

16.73%

13.60%

16-19

2.19%

2.58%

1.98%

1.44%

1.89%

1.83%

20-24

6.87%

7.12%

6.69%

6.20%

7.36%

6.72%

25-34

21.66%

21.33%

21.44%

23.17%

20.27%

20.73%

35-44

22.68%

22.55%

22.50%

23.44%

22.00%

23.44%

45-54

23.71%

23.48%

24.20%

23.28%

25.03%

26.27%

65(+)

4.57%

4.53%

4.67%

4.54%

4.61%

3.51%

Low (0-20k)

5.62%

6.13%

5.45%

4.44%

4.84%

7.75%

Low-mid (20k-40k)

15.14%

16.22%

14.61%

12.83%

14.05%

19.72%

Mid (40k-75k)

28.20%

29.62%

27.88%

25.19%

24.67%

22.58%

Mid-high (75k-100k)

15.97%

16.31%

15.93%

14.98%

16.58%

15.83%

High (100k+)

35.07%

31.72%

36.13%

42.56%

38.86%

34.13%

Sex

Race

Education

Age

Family Income

Notes: The following individuals have been removed: those earning a wage more than $ 0.10 below the minimum
wage, those earning an hourly wage greater than $120, those experiencing a wage change greater than 1,000%, those
listed as self-employed and agricultural workers, and individuals younger than 16. Individuals are weighted by sample
weights included in the CPS.

Section 4: Methodology and Estimation
I estimate Lopresti’s and Mumford’s panel fixed effects model to measure the impact of
the minimum wage on wage growth rates between 2016 and 2019. I re-estimate the model with
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lagged coefficients to test if the minimum wage has a non-contemporaneous impact on wage
growth rates. I then estimate a measure of labor immobility across industries to examine how
monopsony power influences wage growth rates and how changes to the minimum wage impact
individuals in highly monopsonistic industries differently than individuals in more competitive
industries.
In Section 4.1, I describe how Lopresti and Mumford (2016) estimate individuals’ wage
growth absent minimum wage changes. I then describe how they quantify the impact of a minimum
wage increase as the difference between an individual’s wage growth after a minimum wage
increase and the wage growth the worker would have experienced had there been no increase.
Henceforth, whenever I refer to the impact of a minimum wage increase, I am referring to that
difference. Since the estimated percentage change in nominal wage growth will be the same as the
estimated percentage change in real wage growth, this strategy allows me to capture the real impact
of minimum wage changes even though I use nominal dollar values for all applicable variables
throughout my analysis. As discussed in Section 3.1, I control for state price levels to account for
regional price variation.

Section 4.1: Replicating the Model of Lopresti and Mumford (2016)
I begin my analysis by replicating Lopresti’s and Mumford’s model, which allows the
effect of a change in the minimum wage to depend not only on the initial wage of a worker, but
also nonlinearly on the magnitude of the minimum wage change. Modeling minimum wage
changes in this way allows Lopresti and Mumford (2016) to distinguish between the impact of a
relatively small increase in the minimum wage and a relatively large increase. As discussed in
Section 2.2.2, this allowed them to empirically investigate their focal point theory.
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Using CPS outgoing rotation group data between August 2005 and June 2008, Lopresti
and Mumford (2016) estimated the following model:
Equation (1):
'
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The dependent variable %ΔWimys is defined as the fractional wage change (the percentage wage
change divided by 100) between interviews experienced by individual i first interviewed in month
m of year y in state s. The variable 1(WageGroupimys =j) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
individual i has a wage in the range of wage group j at the time of the first interview, which
accounts for differences in the rate of wage growth across the wage distribution. Similarly, the
variable 1(ΔMinWagemys = k) is an indicator equal to 1 if the minimum wage increase in state s in
month m of year y falls within minimum-wage-change group k. The model includes an interaction
of these two indicator variables to allow the effects of differently sized minimum wage increases
to differ across the wage distribution. Lastly, the model includes a vector of controls, Xisy, including
gender, race, ethnicity, education level, family income, a quadratic term in age, the state poverty
rate, the percentage of workers earning a wage that is below the federal minimum wage, the
percentage of workers in the state who belong to a union, the growth rate in state per capita GDP
in the year prior to the individuals’ first interview, the state price level, and the monthly state
unemployment rate.
Lopresti and Mumford (2016) assume that low-wage workers experience wage changes in
the absence of minimum wage increases. They quantify the impact of a minimum wage increase
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as the difference between an individual’s wage growth after a minimum wage increase and the
wage growth the worker would have experienced had there been no increase. To justify their
assumption that wages grow absent minimum wage increases, they provide a table detailing the
wage mobility of low-wage workers in states that did not adjust their minimum wage level in a
given year. I replicate their table with 2016-2019 data in Table 2 to illustrate the presence of wage
mobility within the timeframe of my analysis.
Table 2 illustrates the movement of workers across five wage groups between their first
and second interviews. The sample excludes individuals in states where the minimum wage
changed; thus, the table depicts the counterfactual wage changes we expect individuals to
experience holding the minimum wage constant. Just as Lopresti and Mumford (2016) found using
2005-2008 data, most low-wage workers experienced wage growth absent minimum wage changes
during 2016-2019.7 About 22 percent of the workers who started within 10 percent of the minimum
wage still reported a wage within 10 percent of the minimum wage one year later. Another 21
percent of those workers earned a wage more than double the minimum wage by the time of their
second interview, while the remaining 57 percent reported a wage change somewhere in between.
Wage growth is similarly present in the groups higher in the wage distribution. For example, of
the workers who started within 25-50 percent of the initial minimum wage, over 60 percent of
them reported wages over 50 percent higher than the initial minimum wage. As Lopresti and
Mumford (2016) conclude, “[t]hese simple averages reveal that minimum wage changes are
occurring not in a static environment but rather in one in which there is already a large degree of
upward mobility among low-wage earners” (Lopresti and Mumford, 2016, pp.176-177).

7

Lopresti and Mumford (2016) failed to emphasize that the table displays nominal wage growth; real wages grew
more modestly.
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Table 2: Nominal Wage Mobility (2016-2019)
Second Interview
First Interview

≤ Minimum MW*1.1–
wage*1.1
MW*1.25

MW*1.25–
MW*1.5

MW*1.5–
MW*2

MW*2
<

≤ Minimum wage*1.1

21.57

21.92

17.15

18.38

20.98

MW*1.1–MW*1.25

4.26

25.02

23.13

24.01

23.58

MW*1.25–MW*1.5

2.84

8.9

24.42

30.67

33.16

MW *1.5–MW*2

1.27

3.81

8.89

37.32

48.71

MW*2 <

0.43

1.15

2.62

8.74

87.06

Notes: The above table includes 82,727 individuals from 35 states who did not experience a minimum wage increase
between interviews. Percentages represent the percentage of a given wage bin at the time of the first interview that
belongs to a given bin at the time of the second interview, so that percentages sum horizontally to 100. Individuals are
weighted by ORG sample weights included in the CPS.

In addition to accounting for the fact that wages tend to increase even absent minimum
wage changes, Lopresti and Mumford (2016) stress the importance of heterogeneous minimum
wage increases across the sample so their model can differentiate between minimum wage changes
of different magnitudes. Of the 151,127 individuals sampled between 2016 and 2019, 45.2 percent
of them experienced no minimum wage change; 26 percent experienced a 0-5 percent minimum
wage increase; 16 percent experienced a 5-10 percent minimum wage increase; 2 percent of them
experienced a 10-20 percent minimum wage increase; and 0.4 percent experienced a minimum
wage increase of more than 20 percent. Table 3 below shows the counts of individuals and states
of each minimum wage change group, while the histogram in Figure 3 illustrates the heterogeneity
of the size of the minimum wage increases experienced by the individuals in the sample.
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Table 3: Minimum Wage Change Groups
Minimum Wage Change
No minimum
change

wage

Observations

States

law 82,727

35

0 < minimum wage law 39,909
change ≤ 5%

15

5% < minimum wage law 24,699
change ≤ 10%

15

10% < minimum wage law 3,118
change ≤ 20%

5

20% < minimum wage law 674
change

1

Figure 3: Percentage Change in the Minimum Wage

Notes: The above figure depicts the percentage change in minimum wage laws affecting 68,400 individuals in 25
states who experienced a minimum wage change between interviews.

30

The only workers in my sample who experienced a minimum wage increase larger than 20
percent worked in Arizona during 2016 (674 respondents). Table 1 shows that this group appears
similar to the groups in the survey that experience lesser minimum wage changes despite all
respondents being from one state in one year. If something out of the ordinary not accounted for
by my controls occurred in Arizona’s labor market that year, it could produce strange results. To
account for this, I alter the minimum wage change groups—so the largest bin includes all minimum
wage changes greater than 10 percent—and re-estimate my models as a robustness check.
Finally, I adjust the nominal dollar value constraints on the bins that defined Lopresti’s and
Mumford’s original upper wage groups to reflect the same real cutoffs Lopresti and Mumford
(2016) used.8 I adjust the bins to prevent overlap while maintaining the intention of their initial
groups. Lopresti’s and Mumford’s original top three wage groups roughly corresponded to the top
three wage quartiles. However, since neither Lopresti’s and Mumford’s nor my analysis focuses
on how the groups higher in the wage distribution respond to minimum wage increases, the impact
of having high-pay workers in slightly different groups will not have a meaningful impact on the
estimates of interest. I detail the wage groups as well as their counts and percentages of the total
sample in Table 4 below.

8

I adjusted cutoffs using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) U.S. city average series for
all items, not seasonally adjusted. Accounting for inflation precisely proved mathematically nonsensical. The upper
bound of Lopresti’s and Mumford’s fourth wage group (defined as 1.3*MW < wage ≤ $11) adjusts to roughly $13;
however, 1.3*MW exceeds $13 in many states by 2019. I focused on keeping the real gap between the lower and
upper bound of each group roughly the same as those of Lopresti and Mumford (2016). Though some individuals in
the second wage quartile are now captured by the fourth wage group, the top three wage groups otherwise still
roughly represent the top three wage quartiles.
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Table 4: Wage Groups
Wage Group

Observations

Percent of Sample

1

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW

4,938

3.27%

2

1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW

4,966

3.29%

3

1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW

5,081

3.36%

4

1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00

34,164

22.61%

5

$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00

30,930

20.47%

6

$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00

28,337

18.75%

7

$30.00 < wage

42,711

28.26%

Section 4.2: Estimating the Model of Lopresti and Mumford (2016)
I report the estimated impact of differently sized minimum increases on wage growth rates
in Tables 5 and 6 below. Like Lopresti and Mumford (2016), I calculate the estimated impact of a
minimum wage change of size k for wage group j by summing the coefficients !"k and #$ jk from
Equation (1). The sum !"k + #$ jk represents the general impact of a minimum wage change of size k
plus the unique impact of that minimum wage change on individuals in wage group j.9 I compute
new standard errors for each linear combination of coefficients. Table 5 only displays these

9

For example, to estimate the overall impact of a 0-5 percent minimum wage increase on individuals in the first
wage group, I calculate the sum !"k=2 + #$ j=1,k=2 = 0.019 + (-0.173) = -0.154. I then compute a new standard error for
the linear combination of coefficients.
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estimated effects and corresponding standard errors. Each coefficient represents the impact of a
particularly sized minimum wage increase on individuals in each wage group relative to other
individuals in the same wage group who did not experience a minimum wage change. I display
the estimated impacts graphically in Figure 4 below to allow visual comparisons among groups.
When Lopresti and Mumford (2016) estimated the model with 2005-2008 data, they
concluded that minimum wage increases of less than 5 percent had a statistically significant
negative impact on the wage growth rates of workers in the first, third, and fourth wage groups.
Using 2016-2019 data, I conclude that minimum wage increases of less than 5 percent had a
statistically significant negative impact on the first and second wage groups. Specifically, Table 5
suggests that a minimum wage increase of 5 percent or less causes individuals in the first wage
group to experience 17.3 percentage points less wage growth than they would have absent a
minimum wage increase. Comparably, Lopresti and Mumford (2016) found small minimum wage
changes caused the first wage group to experience 10.8 percentage points less wage growth.
Unlike Lopresti and Mumford (2016), I found that 5-10 percent minimum wage increases
also had a statistically significant negative impact on the first wage group. The coefficient estimate
suggests workers in the first wage group experienced 9.1 percentage points less wage growth than
they would have absent a minimum wage increase. I conclude that minimum wage increases as
large as 10 percent are small enough relative to the size of natural wage increases to serve as focal
points that help low-wage employers limit wage growth.
Lopresti and Mumford (2016) found that minimum wage increases greater than 20 percent
had a statistically significant positive impact on the wage growth rates for the first and second
wage groups between 2005-2008. My results indicate that minimum wage increases of this size
resulted in statistically significant positive impacts for the second and third wage groups but not

33

the first. Individuals in the second and third wage groups experienced 14.4 and 20.9 percentage
points more wage growth, respectively, than their counterparts in the same wage group who did
not experience minimum wage changes. For reference, Lopresti’s and Mumford’s analysis
suggested that minimum wage increases greater than 20 percent resulted in 52.1 and 16.6
percentage points more wage growth for the first and second wage groups, respectively. One
should note that minimum wage increases greater than 20 percent were much more common during
the period Lopresti and Mumford (2016) study. The low incidence of large minimum wage
increases in my sample likely accounts for the insignificant effect experienced by the first wage
group. Additionally, Lopresti’s and Mumford’s sample included individuals experiencing
minimum wage increases greater than 30 and even 40 percent. The largest minimum wage increase
in my sample was less than a 25 percent increase, which may account for why I find that large
minimum wage increases have a smaller positive impact on wage growth rates than Lopresti and
Mumford (2016) found.
Minimum wage changes also caused several of the upper wage groups to experience
statistically significant positive wage growth. This result is unexpected, as minimum wage policy
should not have ripple effects for individuals so high up in the wage distribution. Previous research
has shown the ripple effect is typically limited to those with wages nearest the minimum wage (see
Section 2.2.1). One explanation is that higher minimum wage increases incentivize firms to switch
to more capital-intensive production to avoid increased labor costs. For example, grocery stores
may be inclined to install self-checkout scanners rather than pay their cashiers a higher wage. As
more stores automate their checkout services, they will demand more labor from the high-pay
workers who design and maintain the scanners. As a result of the demand shift, the high-pay
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workers may experience faster wage growth. Similar instances of this type of automation are well
documented (DePillis, 2015).
Table 5: OLS Regression (2016-2019)
Wage Group

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW
1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW
1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW
1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00
$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00
$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00
Wage > $30.00

Minimum Wage Change (%)
0-5%

5-10%

10-20%

>20%

-0.154

-0.101

-0.048

-0.019

(0.037)***

(0.033)***

(0.067)

(0.027)

-0.072

-0.062

-0.022

0.144

(0.033)**

(0.046)

(0.058)

(0.024)***

-0.009

0.038

-0.045

0.209

(0.038)

(0.061)

(0.034)

(0.025)***

-0.001

0.015

0.000

-0.015

(0.020)

(0.031)

(0.033)

(0.021)

0.037

0.061

0.100

0.063

(0.016)**

(0.018)***

(0.047)**

(0.022)***

0.054

0.076

-0.052

0.067

(0.018)***

(0.022)***

(0.023)**

(0.020)***

0.019

-0.010

-0.059

0.015

(0.020)

(0.022)

(0.028)**

(0.020)

Notes: The above table reports results from a single ordinary least squares regression that includes all 151,127
observations. Additional covariates not reported above include race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household
income, age and age squared, the state monthly unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the
annual state union membership rate, the annual state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below
the federal minimum wage, and the state price level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month
and year of the first interview. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.
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Annual Wage Growth Rate

Figure 4: Impact of Differently Sized Minimum Wage Increases Across Wage Group

Notes: I display wage growth rate estimates as percentages rather than fractions for clarity.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.

As discussed in Section 4.1, it could be an issue that the individuals in my sample who
experienced a minimum wage increase greater than 20 percent were all from Arizona and
interviewed in 2016. The low incidence of large minimum wage increases may have caused the
model to imprecisely estimate the impact of large minimum wage increases. As a robustness check,
I combine the two largest minimum wage change groups into one group that captures all minimum
wage increases greater than 10 percent. I report the results in Table 1A, which I display in
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Appendix A. The results are not meaningfully different; the impact of minimum wage increases
greater than 10% is still negative and statistically insignificant for low-wage earners. Thus, as it
has become increasingly uncommon for states to increase their minimum wage level by more than
20 percent, it seems that minimum wage policy has generally had less of a positive impact on wage
growth rates. In Section 5.1, I discuss how these findings contribute to conversations at the state
and national levels concerning how quickly governments should increase the minimum wage.

Section 4.3: Adding Lags and a Lead
The third model I estimate is identical to that of Lopresti and Mumford (2016) except, like
Rinz and Voorheis (2018), I include leads and a lag to investigate whether minimum wage changes
have delayed and anticipatory impacts on wage growth rates. I incorporate three lags and a lead
on the minimum wage change variable to account for the non-contemporaneous effects of
minimum wage changes:
Equation (2):
'

-

+

%∆#!"#$ = %% + ' %& 1(#+,-./012!"#$ = 3) + ' ' 6,* 17%∆89:#+,-"#$ = ;<
&()
-

,(.) *()
'

+

+ ' ' ' =,&* 17#+,-./012!"#$ = 3< × 17%∆89:#+,-"#$ = ;< + ?@!"#$
,(.) &() *()

+ A$ + B" + C# + D!"#$

I define the overall 5-year impact of a minimum wage change as the sum of the three lagged, the
contemporaneous, and the anticipatory effects of the given change. The 5-year impact of a
minimum wage change of size k on wage group j can be thought of as the sum of the general
impacts of a minimum wage change of size k added to the sum of the specific impacts of that
minimum wage change on wage group j. That is, the 5-year impact is estimated as
∑$!%&' (!"!" + #$!#" ) from Equation (2).
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Table 6 displays the overall 5-year impact of differently sized minimum wage changes
across wage groups. The results are not meaningfully different from those reported in Table 5.
Most of the significant effects in the contemporaneous model are still significant, with the impact
of minimum wage increases greater than 20 percent on individuals in the third wage group being
the exception. The magnitude of many of the impacts decreased by roughly a percentage point, but
otherwise the results displayed in Table 5 and Table 6 are similar. Thus, unlike Rinz and Voorheis
(2018), I found the minimum wage did not have a meaningful non-contemporaneous impact on
wage growth rates between 2016 and 2019. As I did with the previous model, I include a robustness
check of the non-contemporaneous model where I combine the two largest minimum wage change
groups into one group that captures all minimum wage increases greater than 10 percent. I report
the estimates in Table 2A, which is displayed in Appendix A. The results are not meaningfully
different from those in Table 1A. In Section 5.2, I discuss potential reasons why my noncontemporaneous models were not significantly different from their counterparts.
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Table 6: OLS Regression (2016-2019): Lags and Lead
Sums of Contemporaneous Effect, Lags, and Lead
Wage Group

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW
1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW
1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW
1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00
$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00
$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00
Wage > $30.00

Minimum Wage Change (%)
0-5%

5-10%

10-20%

>20%

-0.145

-0.096

-0.049

0.129

(0.039)***

(0.028)***

(0.065)

(0.078)

-0.061

-0.062

-0.061

0.135

(0.033)**

(0.052)

(0.066)

(0.040)***

-0.030

0.056

-0.033

-0.001

(0.039)

(0.066)

(0.036)

(0.083)

0.011

0.033

0.025

-0.013

(0.021)

(0.034)

(0.027)

(0.029)

0.046

0.00

0.126

0.050

(0.020)**

(0.022)***

(0.056)**

(0.027)*

0.062

0.094

-0.055

0.087

(0.022)***

(0.024)***

(0.028)*

(0.028)***

0.026

0.000

0.086

0.030

(0.024)

(0.024)

(0.026)***

(0.024)

Notes: The above table reports results from a single ordinary least squares regression that includes all 151,127
observations. Additional covariates not reported above include race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household
income, age and age squared, the state monthly unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the
annual state union membership rate, the annual state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below
the federal minimum wage, and the state price level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month
and year of the first interview. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.

Section 4.4: Developing a Measure for Monopsony
My primary empirical contribution to the literature is to explore whether individuals in
highly monopsonistic industries experience minimum wage changes differently than individuals
in more competitive industries. I generate a measure of monopsony power first created by Corella
(2020): labor immobility10. Labor immobility is defined as the rate at which workers remain in
10

Corella (2020) calls this measure “labor mobility;” however, since it assumes a higher value when workers
experience low mobility across industries, it is more accurately a measure of labor immobility.
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their industries11 when they change jobs. If there is high labor immobility in a particular industry,
it implies there are frictions in the labor market limiting the number of employment options to
which workers in that industry have access. Corella argues that these frictions make labor
immobility a good proxy for monopsony power.
Using basic CPS data from 2003-2019, I use Equation (3) below to calculate the percentage
of workers who do not change industries when they change jobs as my measure of labor
immobility:
Equation (3):
E+F0/ GHH0F9I9JK!$ =

L-H+9:-M!$
L-H+9:-M!$ + 80N-M!$

Remainedis is the total number of workers employed in individuals i’s industry in state s who
remained in individual i’s industry when they change jobs. Movedis is the total number of workers
employed in individuals i’s industry in state s who changed industries when they changed jobs.
Thus, Labor Immobilityis is the rate at which workers in individuals i’s industry in state s remain
in their industry when they change jobs. I produce one labor immobility score for each of the CPS’s
14 parent industries for every state: mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail
trade, transportation and utilities, information, financial activities, professional and business
services, educational and health services, leisure and hospitality, other services, public
administration, and armed forces. A high labor immobility score means there is low mobility of
workers out of a given industry, which implies high monopsony power. I estimate all labor
immobility scores using a minimum of 10 individuals interviewed in the basic CPS who changed

11

Notably, labor immobility at the industry level is not as precise a measure of monopsony power as labor
immobility at the firm level. There may be significant differences in degrees of labor mobility between firms in the
same state and industry. Since the CPS does not have firm-level data, this is the best proxy I was able to produce.
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jobs while working in the given state and industry.12 A complete table of all calculated immobility
scores is available in Appendix B.
If labor immobility is an effective measure of monopsony power, workers in industries
with higher labor immobility should have less wage growth than other individuals. I create an
indicator 1(HighMonopsonyis) equal to 1 if individual i works in an industry in state s that has a
labor immobility score among the top 10 percent of all the individuals in the entire sample. To
contextualize the relative influence of monopsony power, I compare the impact of working in a
highly monopsonistic industry on wage growth rates to that of other important indicators in Table
7 below. The coefficient on 1(HighMonopsonyis) suggests that individuals who worked in the most
monopsonistic industries experienced 1.8 percentage points less wage growth than other
individuals. Comparing this with the impact of other covariates, I find women experienced 16.2
percentage points less wage growth than men, Black workers experienced 4.5 percentage points
less wage growth than workers of other races, and workers without a high school degree
experienced 18.6 percentage points less wage growth than more educated workers. The impact of
monopsony power is substantially smaller than these other impacts, but still statistically significant
and negative, which is consistent with the theory that monopsony power stifles wage growth by
granting employers price-setting power (see Section 2.3).

12

In all the models I estimate below, I drop the 116 individuals in my sample who had labor immobility scores I
could not precisely estimate because fewer than 10 people in the basic CPS who worked in the individual’s state and
industry changed jobs between interviews.
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Table 7: High Monopsony Power and Demographic Indicators
Indicator

Coefficient and SE

High monopsony

-0.018
(0.009)**

Female

-0.162
(0.005)***

Black

-0.045
(0.007)***

Hispanic

-0.059
(0.010)***

No HS diploma

-0.186
(0.009)***

Family income < $50,000

-0.145
(0.006)***

Notes: Each row in the above table reports the results of a separate ordinary least squares regression. Reported
coefficients are for the 151,011 individuals who had monopsony scores. Additional covariates in each model include
minimum wage change group, wage group, interaction terms between minimum wage change group and wage group,
monopsony, race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household income, age and age squared, the state monthly
unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the annual state union membership rate, the annual
state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below the federal minimum wage, and the state price
level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month and year of the first interview. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.

I estimate two additional specifications below to examine how the impact of monopsony
power varies across wage groups. For these specifications, I restrict the sample to exclude
individuals in states where the minimum wage changed. These models depict how monopsony
power impacts workers throughout the wage distribution when the minimum wage is held constant.
Theoretically, high labor immobility should give employers price-setting power regardless of
whether an employee earns a high or low wage. I therefore expect monopsony power in the form
of high labor immobility will negatively impact wage growth rates for all wage groups. I do not
account for minimum wage policy in either of these models.
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In the first specification, I include an interaction term between the high monopsony
indicator and the wage group indicator:
Equation (4):
'

%∆#!"#$ = %% + ' %& 1(#+,-./012!"#$ = 3) + O1(P9,ℎ80:02R0:K!$ )
&()
'

+ ' =& 17#+,-./012!"#$ = 3< × 1(P9,ℎ80:02R0:K!$ ) + ?@!"#$ + A$ + B"
&()

+ C# + D!"#$

By summing *" + #$ jk from Equation (4), I estimate the extent to which individuals working in
highly monopsonistic industries experience wage growth differently from others in their wage
group. I report these differences in Table 8. Surprisingly, the effect was only significant for the
individuals in the top two wage groups, who experienced 4.6 and 4.2 percentage points less wage
growth, respectively. As a robustness check, I replicate the specification using a continuous
measure of monopsony power instead of the high monopsony indicator. The results are reported
in Table 9. They are like those reported in Table 8, except monopsony power has a significant
positive effect on the wage growth rates of individuals in the fourth wage group. A 10 percentage
point increase in an individual’s labor immobility score caused individuals in wage group 4 to
experience 2.1 percentage points more wage growth and those in wage groups 6 and 7 to each
experience 3.2 and 2.5 percentage points less wage growth, respectively. It is surprising that midpay workers in more monopsonistic industries did not experience significant wage growth, while
high-pay workers experienced the expected effect of slower wage growth under the same
conditions. I explore an explanation for this in Section 5.3 of the discussion.
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Table 8: Monopsony Power Across Wage Groups for Individuals Not Experiencing Minimum
Wage Changes (High Monopsony Indicator)
Wage Group
1

HighMonopsonyis = 1

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW

0.040
(0.103)

2

1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW

0.025
(0.090)

3

1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW

0.002
(0.061)

4

1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00

0.014
(0.029)

5

$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00

-0.001
(0.015)

6

$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00

-0.046
(0.012)***

7

Wage > $30.00

-0.042
(0.015)***

Notes: Reported coefficients are for the 151,011 individuals who had monopsony scores. Additional covariates in each
model include race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household income, age and age squared, the state monthly
unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the annual state union membership rate, the annual
state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below the federal minimum wage, and the state price
level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month and year of the first interview. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.
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Table 7: Monopsony Power Across Wage Groups for Individuals Not Experiencing Minimum
Wage Changes (Continuous Monopsony Measure)
Wage Group
1

Running Measure of Labor Immobility
(Monopsony Power)

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW

-0.047
(0.618)

2

1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW

0.321
(0.334)

3

1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW

0.355
(0.331)

4

1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00

0.208
(0.113)*

5

$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00

-0.072
(0.100)

6

$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00

-0.320
(0.097)***

7

Wage > $30.00

-0.246
(0.084)***

Notes: Reported coefficients are for the 151,011 individuals who had monopsony scores. Additional covariates in each
model include race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household income, age and age squared, the state monthly
unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the annual state union membership rate, the annual
state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below the federal minimum wage, and the state price
level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month and year of the first interview. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.

Section 4.5: Does the Impact of the Minimum Wage Depend on Monopsony?
In Section 2.4, I offered hypotheses for how minimum wage changes may impact
individuals in monopsonistic industries differently than other individuals. In short, if Lopresti and
Mumford (2016) are correct that small increases to the minimum wage decrease wage growth rates
because employers treat the minimum wage as a focal point, then small increases to the minimum
wage will have a relatively positive impact on wage growth rates for workers in monopsonistic
industries because their wages may otherwise be stifled due to monopsony power. Similarly, if
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Rinz and Voorheis were correct that large increases to the minimum wage increase wage growth
rates because workers become more attached to their firms, which provides workers with
opportunities to move up the job ladder within their firms, then large increases to the minimum
wage will have a smaller impact on the wage growth rates of workers in monopsonistic industries
because workers in monopsonistic industries are already attached to their jobs.
To test these hypotheses, I incorporate the 1(HighMonopsonyis) indicator variable into
Lopresti’s and Mumford’s original model. As a reminder, 1(HighMonopsonyis) equals 1 if an
individual works in an industry with a labor immobility score high enough to place the individual
among the top 10 percent of those sampled. As discussed above, a high labor immobility score
means there is a low degree of labor mobility out of the industry, implying employers in that
industry wield relatively more price setting power. I interact 1(HighMonopsonyis) with both the
wage group indicator variable and the size of the minimum wage change indicator variable. Lastly,
I include a triple interaction term between all three indicators:
Equation (5):
'
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Tables 5 and 1A reported how the impact of a given minimum wage increase on individuals in
each wage group compared to other individuals in the same wage group who did not experience a
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minimum wage change. Table 10 reports how those impacts differ for individuals in highly
monopsonistic industries relative to the other individuals in their wage group experiencing the
given minimum wage change. Each effect is calculated as STk + #$ jk from Equation (5).
The coefficient estimates of the specification are mostly insignificant. Since minimum
wage change policy typically only affects low-wage earners, my hypotheses were intended for
individuals in the first three wage groups. Among those in the third wage group, small minimum
wage changes had a relatively positive impact on the wage growth rates of individuals working in
highly monopsonistic industries. This finding is consistent with my hypothesis; however, the effect
was only significant at the 10 percent level, and none of the other effects were significant for lowwage earners. Additionally, a few effects were positive and significant for high-wage earners. As
discussed in Section 4.2, high-pay workers may experience faster wage growth if employers
automate their services. It may be that workers in highly monopsonistic industries are more likely
to have occupations relevant to automation.
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Table 10: OLS Regression (2016-2019): Difference in Impact for Those in High Monopsony
Wage Group

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW
1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW
1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW
1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00
$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00
$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00
Wage > $30.00

Minimum Wage Change (%)
0-5%

5-10%

10-20%

0.081

0.010

-0.068

(0.147)

(0.221)

(0.167)

-0.032

0.099

0.227

(0.093)

(0.103)

(0.310)

0.179

-0.025

0.729

(0.101)*

(0.251)

(0.283)

-0.006

-0.036

0.025

(0.030)

(0.056)

(0.144)

0.028

0.020

0.018

(0.017)*

(0.027)

(0.027)

-0.030

0.022

0.209

(0.018)

(0.041)

(0.091)**

0.037

0.031

-0.040

(0.017)**

(0.030)

(0.084)

Notes: Reported coefficients are for the 151,011 individuals who had monopsony scores. Additional covariates include
minimum wage change group, wage group, interaction terms between minimum wage change group and wage group,
monopsony, race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household income, age and age squared, the state monthly
unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the annual state union membership rate, the annual
state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below the federal minimum wage, and the state price
level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month and year of the first interview. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.

The final model I estimate is identical to Equation (5), except I include the three lags and
the lead on the minimum wage change variable:
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Equation (6):
'
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In Section 4.3, I found the overall 5-year impact of minimum wage policy closely resembled the
contemporaneous impact. I now test whether the overall 5-year impact of minimum wage policy
is different for individuals in monopsonistic industries. Tables 6 and 2A reported how the 5-year
impact of a given minimum wage increase on individuals in each wage group compared to other
individuals in the same wage group who did not experience a minimum wage change. Table 13
below reports how those impacts differ for individuals in highly monopsonistic industries relative
to the other individuals in their wage group experiencing the given minimum wage change. Each
effect is calculated as ∑$!%&'(S" /0 + #$!#" ) from Equation (6).
Wage group 3 experienced exactly the hypothesized effects. Within that wage group,
individuals in highly monopsonistic industries experiencing small minimum wage increases had
37 percentage points more wage growth than those in more competitive industries; meanwhile,
individuals in highly monopsonistic industries experiencing large minimum wage increases
reported 194 percentage points less wage growth than those in more competitive industries.
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Though consistent with my hypotheses and significant at the one percent level, these results are
singular and do not fit into a pattern with the remaining coefficient estimates. Most other
significant coefficient estimates belong to the upper wage groups, which is difficult to interpret
because individuals in the upper wage groups should not experience the effects of minimum wage
policy regardless of their industry’s monopsony power. Additionally, the coefficient estimate for
individuals in wage group 2 experiencing small minimum wage increases is significant and
negative, which suggests small minimum wage increases inhibited the wage growth of individuals
in highly monopsonistic industries more so than they hindered the wage growth of those in more
competitive industries. This result contradicts my hypothesis and is difficult to account for with
theoretical reasoning. I discuss the implications of the results reported in Tables 12 and 13 on the
relationship between monopsony and the minimum wage in Section 5.4.
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Table 11: OLS Regression (2016-2019): Difference in Impact for Those in High Monopsony
with Lags and Lead
Sums of Contemporaneous Effect, Three Lags, and Lead
Wage Group

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW
1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW
1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW
1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00
$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00
$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00
Wage > $30.00

Minimum Wage Change (%)
0-5%

5-10%

10-20%

-0.080

-0.202

-0.610

(0.285)

(0.448)

(0.617)

-1.511

-0.152

0.063

(0.338)***

(0.234)

(0.428)

0.370

0.221

-1.943

(0.122)***

(0.372)

(0.493)***

-1.425

-0.118

-0.550

(0.864)

(0.244)

(0.293)*

0.173

-0.013

-0.588

(0.167)

(0.234)

(0.275)**

-0.017

0.035

0.135

(0.020)

(0.028)

(0.049)

0.498

0.088

0.064

(0.266)*

(0.075)

(0.174)

Notes: Reported coefficients are for the 151,011 individuals who had monopsony scores. Additional covariates include
minimum wage change group, wage group, interaction terms between minimum wage change group and wage group,
monopsony, race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household income, age and age squared, the state monthly
unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the annual state union membership rate, the annual
state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below the federal minimum wage, and the state price
level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month and year of the first interview. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.

Section 5: Discussion
In Section 4, I re-estimate Lopresti’s and Mumford’s panel fixed effects model to measure
the impact of the minimum wage on wage growth rates between January 2016 and December 2019.
I draw conclusions mostly consistent with their analysis of the period between August 2005 and
June 2008, with two meaningful exceptions. First, I find evidence that 5-10 percent increases to
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the minimum wage may be small enough to serve as focal points. Second, because large minimum
wage increases have become less common, minimum wage policy may have a less positive impact
on wage growth today than it once did. I discuss the policy implications of these two findings in
Section 5.1.
I then re-estimated Lopresti’s and Mumford’s model with lagged coefficients to test if the
minimum wage has a non-contemporaneous impact on wage growth rates. Though Rinz and
Voorheis found minimum wage policy does have meaningful delayed and anticipatory effects, I
found it does not using data from 2016 to 2019. I discuss reasons for this discrepancy in Section
5.2.
Finally, I used Corella’s measure of labor immobility to examine how monopsony power
influences wage growth rates. I found monopsony power had a statistically significant negative
impact on wage growth rates for high-wage earners, but not for low-wage earners. I explore
reasons for this in Section 5.3. I then incorporated my measure of monopsony power into
Lopresti’s and Mumford’s model to test whether changes to the minimum wage impact individuals
in highly monopsonistic industries differently than individuals in more competitive industries. I
found the differences were mostly insignificant. I explain this result and recommend alternative
methods for future studies in Section 5.4.

Section 5.1: How Quickly Should Policymakers Increase the Minimum Wage?
A decade ago, it was common for states to dramatically increase their minimum wage all
at once. Between 2005 and 2008, the time of Lopresti’s and Mumford’s analysis, several states
increased their minimum wages by more than 30 or 40 percent at a time. But business owners
called foul, claiming these sudden, large changes are impossible to plan for and difficult to afford
without raising prices or terminating workers. The National Restaurant Association all but

52

certainly submitted its annual complaint that “dramatic [rises] in labor costs could force restaurant
owners and operators to raise menu prices, cut back on current employees’ hours, [and] eliminate
positions” (O'Dell, 2019). To avoid shocking employers, state policymakers have taken to
increasing the minimum wage gradually over time, often indexing it to price inflation once it
reaches a desired real level. It is also common for state policymakers to announce a series of annual
minimum wage increases well in advance. For example, when Maine passed a minimum wage
referendum in 2016, legislators announced the minimum wage was going to be increased (from
the federal minimum) to $9.00 per hour in 2017, $10.00 per hour in 2018, $11.00 per hour in 2019,
$12.00 per hour in 2020, and finally indexed to inflation. Economists are yet to agree on whether
gradual increases to the minimum wage have smaller disemployment and inflationary effects.
According to analysis from the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, gradual minimum
wage increases neither raise prices nor cause unemployment (MacDonald et al., 2016). Meanwhile,
researchers at the University of Wisconsin found the immediate disemployment effect of an
increase in the minimum wage in a state that indexes its minimum wage to inflation is significantly
larger than the disemployment effect associated with a nominal increase in the minimum wage
(Brummund and Strain, 2016). More research needs to be done to determine whether gradual
minimum wage increases have different employment and price effects than faster increases.
Unfortunately, even if they cause less inflation and fewer layoffs, my research and that of Lopresti
and Mumford (2016) shows these small minimum wage increases may be less effective at
improving wage growth rates.
Lopresti’s and Mumford’s analysis of the period between 2005-2008 indicated that
minimum wage increases between 0-5 percent may reduce the wage growth rates of workers at or
near the minimum wage. My analysis of the period between 2016-2019 supports their findings,
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with the added observation that minimum wage changes between 5-10 percent may also reduce
wage growth rates for workers at the very bottom of the wage distribution. As discussed in Section
2.2.2, my findings support the theory that employers may tacitly collude in scheduling raises for
low-wage workers using slow minimum wage increases as focal points. If that is indeed the case,
then policies that involve gradually increasing the minimum wage or indexing it to inflation could
be harmful to the wage growth outcomes of low-wage earners. Of course, mine and Lopresti’s and
Mumford’s findings are merely suggestive of focal point theory, but they warrant further research
into the matter.

Section 5.2: On Lags and Leads
In Section 4.3, I conclude that incorporating lags and a lead into Lopresti’s and Mumford’s
original model did not have a meaningful impact on the estimate of the impact of minimum wage
policy. Previous studies, including that of Neumark et al. (2004) and that of Rinz and Voorheis
(2018), found the opposite. The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is data quality. Rinz
and Voorheis used administrative data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) to conduct
their analysis when they concluded the minimum wage has a significant and substantial delayed
impact. They then tried to replicate their results using publicly available CPS data and found they
were unable to precisely estimate the impact. They attribute the mismatch to measurement error
of self-reported wages in the CPS. They also argue that the sample size of the CPS is too small.
Thus, it would be worthwhile for someone with access to the SSA data to replicate my study and
reexamine my hypotheses.

Section 5.3: “Skill-Traps” as Monopsony Power
In Section 4.4, Tables 10 and 11 report that monopsony power only suppressed wage
growth for those in the upper half of the wage distribution. One explanation is that the labor
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immobility measure is too imprecise because it does not detect variation in labor immobility across
wage groups. For example, if an industry in a particular state has high labor immobility for highpay workers but low labor immobility for low-pay-workers, then the reported degree of labor
immobility in the industry would depend on whether there were more high or low-pay workers
used to estimate the measure. If there were more high-pay workers, then the industry would appear
more monopsonistic and vice versa. Thus, it is possible that because there were more high-pay
workers in my sample than low-pay workers, the labor immobility measure tended to reflect the
experiences of high-pay workers. Since the basic CPS (unlike the CPS ORG) does not record
individuals’ wages, I am unable to verify whether the labor immobility of industries varies across
wage groups. I recommend future studies with better data explore this possibility.
A more compelling reason why monopsony power only suppressed wage growth for those
in the upper half of the wage distribution is that high labor immobility may affect high-wage
earners more adversely because they are more likely to have firm-specific skills that trap them in
their employment. Low-wage workers, on the other hand, may always have the option to transition
from job to job without concern for how it suits their skillset, as low-paying jobs are often unskilled
or have basic skills that can be transferred to a new industry. Whether a low-pay worker is
employed in an industry with high labor immobility may be a matter of little consequence. After
all, there is always another minimum wage job available. High-wage workers, however, often have
histories of professional development that bind them to their industries. The “sunk cost” of a
special license, a degree in an uncommon field, or years of experience developing a narrowly
applicable skill set, makes workers more attached to their employers. If miners make $80,000
annually to operate complex machines in Wisconsin, and there are no other mining employers in
the area, the miner may be forced to accept slow wage growth or relocate. Though their skill is

55

highly valuable, there is such low demand for it their employer enjoys price-setting power and can
limit wage growth. Thus, monopsony power in the form of high labor immobility may be more
harmful to high-wage workers than to low-wage workers.

Section 5.4: Why Labor Immobility May Not Influence the Impact of the Minimum Wage
Finally, in Section 4.5, I demonstrate that the impact of the minimum wage does not appear
to depend on whether individuals work in highly monopsonistic industries. In Section 2.4, I
hypothesized small increases to the minimum wage would have a relatively positive impact on
wage growth rates for workers in monopsonistic industries because wages may otherwise be stifled
due to monopsony power. I then hypothesized large increases to the minimum wage would have a
smaller impact on the wage growth rates of workers in monopsonistic industries because workers
in monopsonistic industries are already attached to their jobs. Both hypotheses were unsupported
by the empirical models I estimated. This failure could be due to measurement error in the CPS;
as mentioned in Section 5.2, it could also be a result of high labor immobility being more likely to
burden high-wage earners. However, my results provide suggestive evidence that monopsony
power—in the form of high labor immobility—is more likely to impact high-wage earners and
does not influence how minimum wage policy impacts the wage growth rates of low-wage earners.
I recommend future studies with richer data sets verify these results.

Section 6: Conclusion
Because large increases to the minimum wage are less likely to shock employers, they are
expected to have smaller inflationary and disemployment effects. Consequently, it has become
common practice over the last decade for state policymakers to increase the minimum wage
gradually over time, often indexing it to price inflation once it reaches a desired real level.
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However, Lopresti and Mumford (2016) suggest that low-wage employers collectively use these
small increases to the minimum wage as focal points to restrict wage growth. According to their
empirical analysis, only large increases to the minimum wage improved low-pay workers’ wage
growth rates during 2005-2008. Using data from 2016-2019, I verify their results and find that the
effects of minimum wage policy on wage growth rates are not significantly different for workers
in monopsonistic industries. Thus, though gradual increases to the minimum wage may be easier
for employers to reconcile, what use are they if they fail to improve the wage growth outcomes of
low-pay workers?
The optimal minimum wage increase would raise the total wage bill paid to low-pay
workers and place those workers on a trajectory to higher future earnings without causing too much
inflation or too many layoffs. If future studies determine how differently sized minimum wage
increases cause different levels of shock, then state governments will have sufficient information
to institute beneficial minimum wage policies tailored to their aversion to inflation and
disemployment. States that choose to index their minimum wage level to inflation will be able to
delay each minimum wage increase until enough inflation had accrued for that increase to be of
an optimal magnitude. By eliminating the uncertainty surrounding minimum wage policy,
economists can empower legislators to confidently implement minimum wage increases that will
minimize the costs and consequences for society while serving as stepping-stones to higher-paying
jobs for low-pay workers.
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Appendix A: Wage Group Robustness Check
As a robustness check, I combine the two largest minimum wage change groups into one
group that captures all minimum wage increases greater than 10 percent. I report the results for
the contemporaneous model and the non-contemporaneous model in Tables 6 and 8 below. The
results are not meaningfully different. Since very few individuals (only those working in Arizona
during 2016) experienced minimum wage increases greater than 20 percent, the impact of such
increases is absorbed and drowned out by the much larger group of individuals who experienced
minimum wage increases greater than 10 percent.
Table 1A: OLS Regression (2016-2019): Compressed Minimum Wage Change Groups
Minimum Wage Change (%)
Wage Group

0-5%

5-10%

>10%

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW

-0.154

-0.101

-0.039

(0.037)***

(0.033)***

(0.055)

-0.072

-0.062

-0.029

(0.033)**

(0.046)

(0.058)

-0.009

0.038

-0.030

(0.038)

(0.061)

(0.069)

-0.001

0.015

-0.003

(0.020)

(0.031)

(0.029)

0.037

0.061

0.093

(0.016)**

(0.018)***

(0.039)

0.054

0.076

0.055

(0.018)***

(0.022)***

(0.021)**

0.019

-0.010

0.051

(0.020)

(0.022)

(0.026)*

1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW
1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW
1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00
$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00
$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00
Wage > $30.00

Notes: The above table reports results from a single ordinary least squares regression that includes all 151,127
observations. Additional covariates not reported above include race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household
income, age and age squared, the state monthly unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the
annual state union membership rate, the annual state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below
the federal minimum wage, and the state price level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month
and year of the first interview. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.
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Table 2A: OLS Regression (2016-2019): Lags and Lead and Compressed Minimum Wage
Change Groups
Sums of Contemporaneous Effect, Three Lags, and a Lead
Minimum Wage Change (%)
Wage Group

0-5%

5-10%

10-20%

Wage ≤ 1.1*MW

-0.143

-0.095

-0.030

(0.038)***

(0.028)***

(0.063)

-0.059

-0.061

-0.003

(0.033)**

(0.052)

(0.064)

0.034

0.057

-0.004

(0.039)

(0.066)

(0.043)

0.013

0.034

0.013

(0.021)

(0.034)

(0.026)

0.048

0.071

0.105

(0.020)

(0.022)***

(0.041)**

0.064

0.095

0.062

(0.022)***

(0.024)***

(0.026)**

0.028

0.001

0.07

(0.024)

(0.023)

(0.026)***

1.1*MW < wage ≤ 1.2*MW
1.2*MW < wage ≤ 1.3*MW
1.3*MW < wage ≤ $16.00
$16.00 < wage ≤ $22.00
$22.00 < wage ≤ $30.00
Wage > $30.00

Notes: The above table reports results from a single ordinary least squares regression that includes all 151,127
observations. Additional covariates not reported above include race, ethnicity, gender, education level, household
income, age and age squared, the state monthly unemployment rate, the lagged growth in state per capita GDP, the
annual state union membership rate, the annual state poverty rate, the percentage of workers in the state earning below
the federal minimum wage, and the state price level. Fixed effects are included for the state of residence and the month
and year of the first interview. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Significance levels: ***1%; **5%; *10%.
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State

Appendix B: Labor Immobility
(Monopsony Power) By State and
Industry
Notes: See Section 4.4 for a discussion on how
I estimate labor immobility scores. Agricultural
workers were excluded from my regressions.
State

Industry

Labor
Immobility
Score
73.3%

NV

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

KY

Mining

66.7%

NJ

Educational and health services

66.3%

ME

Educational and health services

66.1%

DE

Educational and health services

65.8%

SC

Construction

64.8%

MA

Educational and health services

64.7%

MS

Educational and health services

64.3%

IL

Educational and health services

64.3%

WI

Educational and health services

64.1%

MD

Educational and health services

63.8%

IN

Educational and health services

63.5%

SC

Educational and health services

63.4%

AL

Educational and health services

63.4%

WV

Mining

63.2%

NV

Construction

63.2%

NC

Educational and health services

63.0%

KS

Educational and health services

63.0%

TN

Educational and health services

63.0%

MS

Transportation and utilities

63.0%

RI

Educational and health services

62.9%

TX

Educational and health services

62.8%

LA

Educational and health services

62.7%

Industry

MO

Educational and health services

Labor
Immobility
Score
62.7%

TN

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

FL

Educational and health services

62.6%

GA

Public administration

59.5%

NH

Financial activities

62.3%

SD

Educational and health services

59.4%

OK

Educational and health services

62.2%

CO

Construction

59.4%

MA

Construction

62.2%

CT

Public administration

59.3%

NJ

Construction

62.2%

LA

Public administration

59.3%

MS

Mining

62.1%

AZ

Public administration

59.3%

NY

Educational and health services

62.0%

MI

Educational and health services

59.2%

NH

Educational and health services

61.9%

FL

Financial activities

59.1%

CT

Financial activities

61.0%

WV

Public administration

59.0%

CA

Educational and health services

61.0%

IA

Educational and health services

59.0%

GA

Leisure and hospitality

60.9%

KY

Educational and health services

58.9%

NV

Educational and health services

60.8%

CO

Educational and health services

58.7%

DE

Construction

60.8%

OR

Educational and health services

58.7%

NV

Leisure and hospitality

60.8%

VA

Construction

58.5%

PA

Educational and health services

60.7%

RI

Construction

58.3%

AR

Educational and health services

60.7%

NM

Financial activities

58.3%

IL

Financial activities

60.7%

LA

Mining

58.2%

NE

Educational and health services

60.4%

SC

Manufacturing

58.2%

VT

Educational and health services

60.4%

TN

Construction

58.2%

ND

Educational and health services

60.3%

ME

Construction

58.2%

DE

Manufacturing

60.2%

WI

Financial activities

58.0%

HI

Educational and health services

60.1%

LA

Financial activities

58.0%

WA

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

60.1%

AK

Educational and health services

58.0%

GA

Educational and health services

60.1%

DE

Financial activities

57.8%

WV

Educational and health services

60.1%

CT

Construction

57.8%

CT

Educational and health services

60.1%

MD

Financial activities

57.8%

DC

Public administration

60.1%

ID

Educational and health services

57.8%

OH

Educational and health services

60.0%

CT

Manufacturing

57.8%

MN

Financial activities

60.0%

MT

Educational and health services

57.7%

VA

Educational and health services

59.9%

AL

Construction

57.7%

CA

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

59.7%

WA

Educational and health services

57.7%
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Industry

Labor
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Score
59.6%

State

Industry

Labor
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Score
57.5%

State

Industry

Labor
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55.6%

State

Industry

Labor
Immobility
Score
54.0%

SC

Public administration

MO

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

DE

Public administration

MN

Educational and health services

57.5%

NH

Transportation and utilities

55.5%

WI

Manufacturing

54.0%

MO

Leisure and hospitality

57.4%

FL

Construction

55.4%

MS

Manufacturing

54.0%

KS

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

57.4%

HI

Leisure and hospitality

55.4%

AZ

Construction

53.9%

NM

Educational and health services

57.3%

MN

Construction

55.3%

OH

Financial activities

53.9%

GA

Transportation and utilities

57.2%

MA

Leisure and hospitality

55.3%

AL

Mining

53.8%

IN

Construction

57.1%

OK

Leisure and hospitality

55.3%

DE

Transportation and utilities

53.8%

CA

Construction

56.9%

KS

Manufacturing

55.2%

NH

Manufacturing

53.8%

TN

Manufacturing

56.8%

DC

Educational and health services

55.1%

DC

Financial activities

53.7%

IN

Public administration

56.8%

MS

Construction

55.1%

MS

Leisure and hospitality

53.7%

KY

Financial activities

56.8%

OR

Transportation and utilities

55.0%

DE

Information

53.7%

HI

Financial activities

56.7%

AL

Manufacturing

54.8%

MO

Financial activities

53.6%

WA

Construction

56.6%

PA

Financial activities

54.8%

NY

Public administration

53.6%

NC

Construction

56.6%

NM

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

54.7%

SD

Transportation and utilities

53.6%

AZ

Educational and health services

56.6%

RI

Public administration

54.7%

AZ

Financial activities

53.5%

AR

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

56.6%

MA

Manufacturing

54.6%

MD

Public administration

53.5%

MI

Transportation and utilities

56.5%

CA

Financial activities

54.5%

SC

Financial activities

53.5%

VT

Public administration

56.5%

LA

Leisure and hospitality

54.5%

GA

Financial activities

53.5%

IL

Manufacturing

56.4%

UT

Construction

54.4%

WI

Public administration

53.5%

NY

Financial activities

56.4%

RI

Financial activities

54.4%

KY

Manufacturing

53.4%

LA

Construction

56.3%

WV

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

54.3%

NC

Manufacturing

53.4%

MO

Construction

56.3%

NJ

Public administration

54.3%

SD

Manufacturing

53.4%

VT

Construction

56.2%

UT

Educational and health services

54.3%

ME

Transportation and utilities

53.3%

FL

Public administration

56.1%

HI

Construction

54.2%

CO

Financial activities

53.3%

AZ

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

56.0%

OR

Financial activities

54.2%

VA

Public administration

53.2%

NY

Construction

55.9%

DE

Wholesale and retail trade

54.2%

VA

Financial activities

53.2%

OR

Manufacturing

55.9%

TX

Financial activities

54.2%

TN

Other services

53.2%

DC

Professional and business services

55.9%

WV

Leisure and hospitality

54.1%

VT

Wholesale and retail trade

53.2%

LA

Information

55.9%

IL

Construction

54.1%

IL

Leisure and hospitality

53.2%

FL

Leisure and hospitality

55.8%

CO

Leisure and hospitality

54.1%

ID

Construction

53.2%

OH

Public administration

55.7%

NJ

Financial activities

54.0%

MD

Leisure and hospitality

53.2%

DC

Construction

55.7%

LA

Transportation and utilities

54.0%

IA

Public administration

53.2%

65

State

Industry

Labor
Immobility
Score
53.2%

State

Industry

MI

Construction

NE

Construction

Labor
Immobility
Score
52.2%

CA

Other services

KS

Financial activities

53.1%

KS

Construction

52.1%

DC

Wholesale and retail trade

51.3%

SC

Information

53.1%

TX

Construction

52.0%

WI

Leisure and hospitality

51.2%

MA

Public administration

53.1%

DE

Professional and business services

52.0%

NM

Construction

51.2%

OK

Public administration

53.0%

AL

Financial activities

52.0%

VA

Professional and business services

51.1%

NJ

Wholesale and retail trade

52.9%

OH

Construction

51.9%

NM

Leisure and hospitality

51.1%

WA

Public administration

52.9%

IA

Manufacturing

51.9%

NE

Financial activities

51.1%

NC

Financial activities

52.9%

IN

Manufacturing

51.8%

MD

Construction

51.1%

ME

Manufacturing

52.8%

MT

Construction

51.8%

IN

Financial activities

51.1%

MA

Professional and business services

52.8%

NH

Other services

51.7%

RI

Transportation and utilities

51.1%

WA

Leisure and hospitality

52.8%

SC

Transportation and utilities

51.7%

WA

Manufacturing

51.0%

OH

Manufacturing

52.8%

PA

Leisure and hospitality

51.7%

AR

Construction

51.0%

ME

Financial activities

52.8%

NY

Leisure and hospitality

51.7%

KS

Public administration

51.0%

HI

Professional and business services

52.8%

NV

Mining

51.6%

TN

Financial activities

50.9%

AR

Transportation and utilities

52.8%

RI

Leisure and hospitality

51.6%

NC

Wholesale and retail trade

50.9%

MS

Financial activities

52.7%

NH

Construction

51.6%

WI

Construction

50.9%

AZ

Leisure and hospitality

52.7%

TX

Leisure and hospitality

51.6%

CA

Leisure and hospitality

50.8%

MI

Manufacturing

52.7%

IN

Transportation and utilities

51.6%

PA

Public administration

50.7%

TX

Public administration

52.7%

NC

Public administration

51.5%

CA

Public administration

50.6%

OK

Transportation and utilities

52.7%

MA

Financial activities

51.5%

IL

Public administration

50.6%

AL

Transportation and utilities

52.6%

MI

Financial activities

51.5%

MI

Public administration

50.5%

WY

Educational and health services

52.5%

NY

Transportation and utilities

51.5%

ND

Leisure and hospitality

50.5%

NE

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

52.5%

DC

Leisure and hospitality

51.5%

CA

Wholesale and retail trade

50.5%

RI

Manufacturing

52.5%

NE

Public administration

51.5%

CT

Wholesale and retail trade

50.5%

UT

Mining

52.5%

CO

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

51.5%

KY

Public administration

50.5%

ME

Public administration

52.4%

CT

Leisure and hospitality

51.5%

TX

Transportation and utilities

50.4%

MD

Professional and business services

52.4%

AK

Public administration

51.4%

CO

Public administration

50.3%

PA

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

52.4%

WA

Financial activities

51.4%

CA

Manufacturing

50.3%

WY

Mining

52.4%

SC

Other services

51.4%

VT

Financial activities

50.3%

NJ

Leisure and hospitality

52.3%

ID

Financial activities

51.4%

FL

Transportation and utilities

50.3%

AL

Leisure and hospitality

52.3%

PA

Manufacturing

51.3%

VA

Leisure and hospitality

50.2%

OK

Financial activities

52.3%

IA

Construction

51.3%

CA

Transportation and utilities

50.2%
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Industry

Labor
Immobility
Score
51.3%

State

Industry

Labor
Immobility
Score
50.2%

State

Industry

Labor
Immobility
Score
49.3%

State

Industry

Labor
Immobility
Score
48.7%

OR

Construction

PA

Construction

WI

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

WA

Professional and business services

50.2%

AL

Wholesale and retail trade

49.3%

SC

Wholesale and retail trade

48.7%

TN

Leisure and hospitality

50.2%

NY

Wholesale and retail trade

49.3%

IA

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

48.7%

GA

Construction

50.0%

WV

Wholesale and retail trade

49.3%

IN

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

48.6%

GA

Manufacturing

50.0%

SC

Leisure and hospitality

49.3%

MN

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

48.6%

HI

Public administration

50.0%

NH

Public administration

49.3%

MS

Wholesale and retail trade

48.6%

IN

Information

50.0%

AK

Financial activities

49.3%

AK

Construction

48.5%

OH

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

50.0%

MN

Information

49.3%

WA

Information

48.5%

OK

Mining

50.0%

NV

Wholesale and retail trade

49.2%

SD

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

48.5%

TN

Public administration

50.0%

RI

Wholesale and retail trade

49.2%

DC

Transportation and utilities

48.5%

WY

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

50.0%

FL

Professional and business services

49.2%

IL

Transportation and utilities

48.5%

FL

Wholesale and retail trade

49.9%

HI

Transportation and utilities

49.1%

OR

Public administration

48.5%

IL

Professional and business services

49.9%

MI

Wholesale and retail trade

49.1%

ND

Construction

48.4%

VT

Manufacturing

49.8%

MO

Wholesale and retail trade

49.1%

AL

Professional and business services

48.4%

DE

Leisure and hospitality

49.8%

MD

Transportation and utilities

49.1%

VA

Transportation and utilities

48.4%

ND

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

49.8%

KY

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

49.1%

AR

Manufacturing

48.3%

CT

Professional and business services

49.8%

CA

Professional and business services

49.0%

PA

Wholesale and retail trade

48.3%

OH

Leisure and hospitality

49.7%

MT

Leisure and hospitality

49.0%

VA

Manufacturing

48.3%

MO

Transportation and utilities

49.7%

OK

Construction

49.0%

KS

Transportation and utilities

48.3%

NV

Transportation and utilities

49.7%

GA

Professional and business services

48.9%

TN

Professional and business services

48.3%

ME

Wholesale and retail trade

49.6%

ME

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

48.9%

AL

Public administration

48.2%

MT

Public administration

49.6%

NC

Other services

48.9%

NY

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

48.1%

OR

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

49.6%

PA

Information

48.9%

WV

Construction

48.1%

MI

Leisure and hospitality

49.6%

DC

Other services

48.8%

UT

Public administration

48.1%

NM

Public administration

49.6%

AZ

Wholesale and retail trade

48.8%

TX

Other services

48.0%

CA

Information

49.6%

NC

Leisure and hospitality

48.8%

SC

Professional and business services

48.0%

MN

Public administration

49.5%

ND

Mining

48.8%

CO

Manufacturing

47.9%

IA

Leisure and hospitality

49.5%

NY

Professional and business services

48.8%

CO

Professional and business services

47.9%

MD

Information

49.5%

KY

Wholesale and retail trade

48.7%

TN

Information

47.8%

PA

Transportation and utilities

49.4%

IL

Wholesale and retail trade

48.7%

TX

Wholesale and retail trade

47.8%

MD

Wholesale and retail trade

49.4%

NV

Financial activities

48.7%

ND

Financial activities

47.7%

ME

Leisure and hospitality

49.4%

TN

Transportation and utilities

48.7%

FL

Other services

47.7%
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47.7%

State

Industry

Labor
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46.8%

State

Industry

Labor
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45.7%

AK

Information

NJ

Professional and business services

MN

Professional and business services

IN

Wholesale and retail trade

47.7%

NM

Mining

46.8%

TX

Manufacturing

45.6%

MA

Wholesale and retail trade

47.7%

UT

Financial activities

46.8%

WI

Other services

45.6%

NE

Transportation and utilities

47.7%

WI

Wholesale and retail trade

46.7%

ND

Manufacturing

45.6%

OR

Professional and business services

47.6%

MA

Information

46.7%

TN

Wholesale and retail trade

45.4%

HI

Wholesale and retail trade

47.6%

VT

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

46.7%

AZ

Professional and business services

45.4%

MT

Financial activities

47.6%

NE

Manufacturing

46.5%

CT

Transportation and utilities

45.4%

WV

Transportation and utilities

47.6%

OH

Wholesale and retail trade

46.5%

FL

Manufacturing

45.4%

AR

Public administration

47.6%

NV

Information

46.4%

OK

Manufacturing

45.4%

IA

Financial activities

47.5%

TX

Professional and business services

46.4%

IA

Wholesale and retail trade

45.3%

NJ

Transportation and utilities

47.5%

OK

Other services

46.4%

IA

Professional and business services

45.3%

LA

Wholesale and retail trade

47.5%

KY

Construction

46.4%

FL

Information

45.3%

PA

Professional and business services

47.4%

AL

Other services

46.3%

HI

Manufacturing

45.3%

RI

Professional and business services

47.4%

IA

Other services

46.3%

MA

Other services

45.3%

MN

Leisure and hospitality

47.3%

NV

Professional and business services

46.2%

WV

Financial activities

45.3%

NH

Leisure and hospitality

47.3%

CT

Information

46.2%

NH

Wholesale and retail trade

45.2%

ID

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

47.3%

NC

Transportation and utilities

46.0%

AZ

Transportation and utilities

45.2%

AR

Leisure and hospitality

47.3%

MI

Professional and business services

46.0%

KY

Professional and business services

45.2%

MT

Mining

47.2%

MO

Professional and business services

46.0%

NH

Information

45.2%

AK

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

47.2%

WA

Wholesale and retail trade

46.0%

NJ

Other services

45.2%

MN

Wholesale and retail trade

47.2%

MT

Wholesale and retail trade

46.0%

DE

Other services

45.1%

VA

Wholesale and retail trade

47.1%

AL

Information

45.9%

VT

Transportation and utilities

45.1%

CO

Transportation and utilities

47.1%

GA

Information

45.9%

UT

Wholesale and retail trade

45.1%

NV

Public administration

47.1%

LA

Manufacturing

45.9%

OK

Wholesale and retail trade

45.0%

GA

Wholesale and retail trade

47.1%

NM

Other services

45.8%

NM

Professional and business services

45.0%

ID

Professional and business services

47.1%

OK

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

45.8%

KS

Leisure and hospitality

45.0%

AR

Mining

47.1%

UT

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

45.8%

WY

Public administration

45.0%

NJ

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

47.1%

NM

Wholesale and retail trade

45.8%

WV

Other services

45.0%

MI

Other services

46.9%

MT

Transportation and utilities

45.8%

ID

Leisure and hospitality

44.9%

OR

Wholesale and retail trade

46.9%

ND

Wholesale and retail trade

45.7%

IN

Leisure and hospitality

44.9%

MN

Manufacturing

46.9%

TX

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

45.7%

NY

Information

44.9%

NY

Manufacturing

46.8%

OR

Leisure and hospitality

45.7%

WI

Transportation and utilities

44.8%
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44.7%
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43.4%
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Industry
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42.3%

UT

Professional and business services

MI

Information

SC

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

MT

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

44.6%

VT

Leisure and hospitality

43.4%

TX

Information

42.3%

NJ

Manufacturing

44.6%

FL

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

43.3%

IL

Information

42.2%

OR

Other services

44.6%

SD

Financial activities

43.3%

GA

Other services

42.1%

AR

Wholesale and retail trade

44.6%

ID

Transportation and utilities

43.3%

MS

Information

42.1%

MN

Transportation and utilities

44.6%

AL

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

43.2%

AK

Transportation and utilities

42.1%

MO

Public administration

44.6%

HI

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

43.2%

NJ

Information

42.0%

WV

Manufacturing

44.5%

RI

Information

43.2%

IA

Information

42.0%

MS

Professional and business services

44.5%

WY

Construction

43.2%

AR

Financial activities

41.9%

WY

Transportation and utilities

44.5%

ID

Wholesale and retail trade

43.1%

AK

Leisure and hospitality

41.8%

OK

Professional and business services

44.5%

AK

Mining

43.1%

NM

Transportation and utilities

41.8%

WY

Financial activities

44.4%

WV

Professional and business services

43.1%

MS

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

41.7%

SD

Construction

44.4%

NH

Professional and business services

43.0%

MO

Manufacturing

41.6%

MT

Other services

44.2%

IA

Transportation and utilities

43.0%

NY

Other services

41.6%

NC

Professional and business services

44.2%

MT

Manufacturing

43.0%

ND

Public administration

41.6%

OK

Information

44.2%

OH

Professional and business services

42.9%

KS

Other services

41.5%

TX

Mining

44.1%

ID

Public administration

42.9%

PA

Other services

41.5%

KS

Wholesale and retail trade

44.1%

MT

Professional and business services

42.9%

VT

Other services

41.4%

VA

Other services

44.0%

RI

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

42.9%

CO

Information

41.2%

KS

Professional and business services

44.0%

AZ

Manufacturing

42.8%

MO

Other services

41.2%

MS

Other services

44.0%

WA

Transportation and utilities

42.8%

MN

Other services

41.1%

OH

Transportation and utilities

43.9%

NE

Wholesale and retail trade

42.7%

UT

Leisure and hospitality

41.1%

RI

Other services

43.9%

NE

Leisure and hospitality

42.7%

IN

Other services

41.1%

NV

Other services

43.9%

MS

Public administration

42.7%

ND

Professional and business services

41.1%

CO

Wholesale and retail trade

43.8%

KY

Leisure and hospitality

42.7%

DC

Information

41.0%

OH

Information

43.8%

CT

Other services

42.6%

MD

Manufacturing

41.0%

WY

Leisure and hospitality

43.8%

CO

Other services

42.6%

MD

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

40.9%

AK

Wholesale and retail trade

43.8%

LA

Professional and business services

42.5%

WI

Professional and business services

40.9%

AZ

Other services

43.7%

SD

Wholesale and retail trade

42.5%

KY

Transportation and utilities

40.9%

AK

Professional and business services

43.7%

UT

Other services

42.4%

WY

Wholesale and retail trade

40.9%

ND

Transportation and utilities

43.6%

KS

Information

42.4%

SD

Public administration

40.8%

UT

Transportation and utilities

43.5%

SD

Leisure and hospitality

42.3%

ME

Information

40.7%
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State

Industry

Labor
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37.7%

VA

Information

AR

Other services

ME

Professional and business services

40.7%

OR

Information

37.7%

IN

Professional and business services

40.6%

HI

Information

37.5%

MD

Other services

40.6%

NM

Manufacturing

37.5%

WA

Other services

40.6%

AR

Professional and business services

37.4%

NC

Information

40.3%

AK

Manufacturing

37.3%

HI

Other services

40.2%

AZ

Information

37.1%

NV

Manufacturing

40.2%

DC

Manufacturing

37.1%

ME

Other services

40.1%

NC

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

37.1%

SD

Professional and business services

40.1%

VT

Information

37.1%

CO

Mining

40.0%

NE

Other services

37.1%

CT

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

40.0%

KS

Mining

37.0%

MI

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

40.0%

NE

Professional and business services

36.8%

OH

Other services

40.0%

SD

Other services

36.5%

PA

Mining

40.0%

ND

Information

36.4%

IL

Other services

39.8%

DE

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

36.0%

UT

Manufacturing

39.8%

AK

Other services

35.4%

WY

Professional and business services

39.6%

WY

Information

35.0%

AR

Information

39.5%

SD

Information

34.9%

ID

Other services

39.5%

WY

Other services

34.7%

WI

Information

39.1%

NE

Information

34.5%

ND

Other services

39.1%

UT

Information

34.5%

VT

Professional and business services

38.9%

NM

Information

34.1%

CA

Mining

38.9%

NH

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

34.0%

LA

Other services

38.9%

KY

Information

33.3%

LA

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

38.6%

WV

Information

32.4%

MA

Transportation and utilities

38.5%

MA

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

31.6%

OH

Mining

38.5%

GA

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

31.4%

KY

Other services

38.3%

WY

Manufacturing

30.5%

IL

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

38.0%

ID

Information

30.0%

ID

Manufacturing

37.8%

VA

Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting

27.8%

MO

Information

37.8%

MT

Information

25.6%
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